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The present work analyzes two decades of Georgian defense institution-building since the 
country gained independence from the Soviet Union at the start of the 1990s. Georgia has 
succeeded from being a failing state in the ‘90s to the nation state that is able to 
contribute in international security efforts with its NATO/Partnership for Peace allies and 
partners. However, the country still needs to continue its efforts to build democratic and 
successful state institutions, including those of security and defense. The objective of the 
work at hand is to reveal the challenges that the Georgian defense institution faced during 
its establishment and transformation. In particular, this study assesses manpower 
management as a reflection of the institutional process and challenge to defense 
institution-building in Georgia’s young history as an independent nation state since 1991. 
Due to the common Communist legacy and path to NATO integration, this analysis of the 
political and other factors that challenged the Central and Eastern European states has 
relevance here. The work can serve as a guide and primer as well as comparative analysis 
for the defense institution-building effort in other parts of the world, especially in post-
Communist nation-states.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis analyzes two decades of Georgia’s contemporary defense institution-
building by assessing its programmatic progress, failures, and challenges in comparison 
with the experience of the new (that is, post-1989) NATO members in the recent 
accession process since 1995. This work outlines further efforts in various realms of state 
and will evaluate the armed forces’ need to develop more effective defense institutions 
amid rapid change in the strategic world. In particular, this study assesses manpower 
management as a reflection of the institutional process, and challenges to defense 
institution-building in Georgia’s young history as an independent nation state prior to, 
and since, 1991. Despite its extensive attempts at progress in defense institution building, 
the government of Georgia still needs to focus on achieving effective defense systems 
that provide national security, and on becoming fully compatible with NATO 
membership criteria. The primary question this thesis will answer is: What factors 
impede Georgia from successfully achieving defense institution building? 
The challenges in responding to this thesis question have been multiple. In the 
1990s, the newly established Georgian security institutions were still functioning like 
Soviet-type organizations. At that time citizens of Georgia felt particularly sensitive 
about their national, political, and ethnic identities. Additionally, Russia was attempting 
to restore its political influence over the region. All of these factors played a role in one 
civil and two ethnic wars in the country. These conditions operated during the course of 
the 1990s, when defense institutions were first established in Georgia under challenging 
conditions that exceeded those of Central Europe. In parallel, the Georgian Armed Forces 
(GAF) and the Ministry of Defense (MoD) suffered from a legislative insufficiency, 
scarceness of resources, a high rate of corruption, a Soviet inherited administration, and a 
lack of skills and professionalism. 
  
 1 
Despite the doubts in the country and in the West, and what seemed at the 
beginning as a nearly impossible prospect, Euro-Atlantic integration was the only way to 
start development of the defense institutions, “as in many Central and East European 
countries.”1 In addition, there was little progress toward extricating Georgia from its 
dilemma of inadequate security and government. When Eduard Shevardnadze, the 
President of Georgia (and previous Foreign Minister of USSR), began talking about 
“knocking on NATO’s door,” few people with authority had a clear understanding of the 
various challenges or the advantages of the NATO integration. The first years were 
marked by frustration and setbacks, which ultimately gave way to the 2003 Rose 
Revolution. The new Georgian government, led by President Mikheil Saakashvili, and 
referred to as the “Reform Team,” made significant reforms to the security sector, to the 
process of democratization, to the economy, and to the fight against crime and corruption. 
The course toward defense institution-building and NATO integration intensified 
through the establishment of democratic civilian control over the newly created and 
untested armed forces. In 2004, with encouragement from NATO nations, Georgia began 
defense reforms via the Strategic Defense Review (SDR). The SDR considered the 
development of a conceptual framework and outlining short-, mid- and long-term 
development plans. In parallel, increased defense budget and international assistance—
especially from the U.S.—improved GAF capabilities and made them more compatible 
with NATO. This enabled GAF to participate in international operations, such as with the 
Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghan campaigns.  
A brutal and heartbreaking development in this process was the 2008 Russian-
Georgian War, an event that underscored the security problems of the Caucasus, as well 
as the ambition of the Russians to put a stop to NATO enlargement. Georgia attempted to 
resolve the financial and infrastructure loss resulting from this brief conflict by increasing 
international assistance, focusing on the economy, and supporting the national will to 
retain independence. During its first term, Saakashvili’s government achieved much 
success and demonstrated its ability to implement radical reforms (e.g., extracting 
1Chris Donnelly, “Reform Realities,” in Post-Cold War Defense Reform Lessons Learned in Europe 
and the United States, eds. Istvan Gyarmati and Theodor Winkler (Washington, D.C: Brassey`s, 2002), 40. 
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corruption, gaining broad population support for democratization), although at some 
point, further institution building appeared constrained by the political interference.  
As the theories of civil-military relations2 and practices of East European 
countries like Hungary3 suggest, the teething problems of the democratic civilian control 
have hampered vigorous democratic civil-military relationships and defense institution-
building processes. Throughout the 2000s, the weakness of the civilian institutions in 
Central and Western Europe have promoted “common failing with frequently disastrous 
results.”4 To respond to these failings, this thesis will focus on the second phase of the 
institution building, when the basic financial, logistical, and infrastructural requirements 
were met and the main challenge was related to effective civilian control. Even later, 
when available training and education enabled personnel to further development, defense 
policy still remained less effective amid the subjects of domestic and international 
criticism. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
The importance of this thesis is manifest in the fate of the Caucasus as a question 
of contemporary European security, and the efficacy and prospects for the NATO-
Russian relationship, and the vitality of new democracies in regions of crisis. This case 
also speaks to the record of democratic defense institution-building since 1991. Defense 
institutions form the core element in ensuring Georgia’s sovereignty, national security, 
and foreign policy priority integration into NATO, and they also have greatly aided in the 
building of a modern democratic state. 
Supported by NATO integration, defense institution-building contributes to the 
necessary development of the civil society in the country, due to the Soviet legacy and its 
entropy of state and society. Georgia should realize that “integration with NATO is more 
2Samuel P. Huntington, “Power, Professionalism, and Ideology: Civil-Military Relations in Theory,” 
in The Soldier and the State the Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1957), 80‒84. 
3Jeffrey Simon, Hungary and NATO Problems in Civil-Military Relations (Lanham, Maryland: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2003). 
4Donnelly, Reform Realities, 42. 
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than integration with military alliance. The integration with a community of values is 
based on freedom, individual liberty, democracy, the rule of law, respect for human 
rights, and the rights of minorities.”5 Georgia knows it must share these values and 
establish contemporary systems of defense management. Defense institutions, to be 
effective, require long-term planning, integrity, and respect for established rules more 
than individual rules. These new requirements will also support the development of a new 
organizational culture within defense institutions, and will encourage positive cultural 
changes. As defense institutional capacity is developing, it can become the best practice 
for other state institutions. Finally, defense institution-building considers well-educated 
and skilled military personnel and defense civilians, and they are becoming more capable 
contributors to state societal development.6 
Since its beginning, defense institution-building in Georgia has made considerable 
progress in absolute terms from the nadir of 1991; however, as is often the case when 
parliaments in the West look askance at soldiers and armies as a function of budget, and 
as a U.S. Congressional report in 2010 stated, “In practically all areas, GAF defense 
institutions, strategies, doctrine, and professional military education were found to be 
seriously lacking.”7 Therefore, it is important to explore such short falls and study the 
aspects that are crucial to overcome them, especially when the defense institution-
building fails to be an object of policy analysis in Georgia.  
After 2008, only a few Georgian and foreign experts studied defense institution 
building; however, their work was constrained due to the lack of institutional 
transparency. According to the Institute of Development of Freedom of Information, the 
5 Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Joint Press Conference with President of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili and 
NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, June 27, 2013, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_101792.htm. 
6Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (London: Collier-
Macmillan Limited, 1971), 430‒435. 
7Georgia: One Year after the August War: Hearing before the Subcommittee on European Affairs of 
the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate. 111th Cong. 17 (August 2009). 
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Georgian Ministry of Defense has been revealed as one of the “most closed”8 civil 
agencies in terms of sharing public information. Limiting the public and expert awareness 
of defense institutions, the MoD has constrained the opportunity for a better use of the 
assistance of partners—including the U.S.—and has also limited the possibility of 
comprehensive research. This research would contribute to a better understanding of the 
existing challenges to more effectively developing defense institutions. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Institution building in a state represents a long and complex process, and many 
soldiers and civilians have little insight into its dynamics and imponderables. In a 
democracy’s defense, institution building starts with institutionalization of democratic 
control, often with a legacy of totalitarian or authoritarian statecraft that has ended 
poorly. This considers civilian and legislative involvement and supervision in the 
development, endorsement, and implementation of policies and strategies, and also 
decision making in the defense field. The important part is to establish appropriate 
procedures to ensure that laws are properly implemented and defense institutions 
cooperate to achieve common goals.9 
Georgia has achieved progress over the last ten years in establishing civilian 
control; developing defense legislation, policies, and strategies; reforming the defense 
institutions by defeating corruption; training and educating personnel; and forming inter- 
and intra-agency cooperation mechanisms. The Georgian Armed Forces are compatible 
and able to operate with the NATO Allies armed forces in international peacekeeping 
missions. At the same time, the following concerns continue to arise: nearly all concepts 
in the defense field lack plans for implementation; civilian control lacks competence and 
sufficiency; command and control, decision making, and resource allocation lack 
effectiveness and efficiency; and further training and development are required to 
8 Institute for Development of Freedom of Information, “Public Information Database.” 
www.Opendata.Ge, http://www.idfi.ge/?cat=main&topic=222&lang=en&header 
=Presentation%20of%20the%20Results%20of%20the%20Project%20%E2%80%9CPublic%20Information
%20Database%20%E2%80%93%20www.opendata.ge%E2%80%9D (accessed 11/20, 2013). 
9Hari Bucur-Marcu, Essentials of Defence Institution Building (Vienna, Austria: National Defence 
Academy: Austrian Ministry of Defence and Sports, 2010), 20. 
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implement the mechanisms of a more effective utilization and management of personnel 
competencies.  
One hypothesis regarding the cause of this situation is that parliamentarian 
oversight is weak, thus impeding defense institution building. Parliamentary oversight, 
which has been developed from a non-existence level in the 1990s to the capacity of 
holding the security sector accountable, still lacks effectiveness.  
The second hypothesis is related to the political immaturity and interference that 
is defined as “political will.” The impatience, personally biased decisions, and desire to 
accomplish goals quickly, and ‘to take short-cuts’ while compromising the basic 
principles of rule of law and “international best practices,” are often used to illustrate the 
way Georgian reforms impede institutionalization of the reforms and achieved progress.  
The final hypothesis lies in the lack of professional expertise as the institutional 
factor that impedes the defense institution building. Georgia still lacks educational 
opportunities in the defense and security field. Yet there are no educational programs in 
the security field in civilian higher education schools. The National Defense Academy 
provides ongoing reforms and offers tactical and operational courses. Partners offer broad 
opportunities to Georgian military and defense civilians, and in response, the level of 
expertise is increasing in defense institutions. In parallel, the relatively short institutional 
history and traditions, still shaded by post-Soviet influence, do not encourage initiatives 
and independent decision making on lower levels. While the knowledge and skills 
received in international educational and training institutions are accumulated on such 
lower levels among junior and mid-career officers and civilians, their exclusion from 
decision making affects the progress of institutionalization. 
 6 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The statement “the security sector is little studied in Georgia,” expressed in 
2004,10 is still valid and relevant in terms of providing a comprehensive picture of the 
whole sector, including defense institutions. The reason that the security sector has not 
been examined thoroughly is undoubtedly rooted in the fact that defense institutions have 
always been less transparent in Georgia. The resulting lack of primary sources and 
expertise on a national level shapes the scarcity of literature.  
Initial attempts at a comprehensive analysis of the defense sector conducted by 
international experts (i.e., the International Security Advisory Board, ISAB, and the first 
White Paper on the Georgian defense mission and status, published in 2002) served as 
primary sources for scholastic analysis. Later on, the development and publishing of 
security and defense concept documents, such as the National Security Concept (2005, 
2011), National Military Strategy (2005), Minister’s Vision (annual or semi-annual), and 
Strategic Defense Review (2007, 2013),11 have filled the gap in the absence of the 
strategy and concepts and have provided the possibility for learning and analyzing the 
vision, strategy, development plans, and reforms progression in the defense sector.  
The Minister of Defense has launched a series of Georgia Defense Conferences 
(2006–2013), and begun cooperation with the NGO’s alliance Civil Council on Defense 
and Security. Together with the existing legislation on defense, the security and defense 
documents opened the floor to scholars to summarize and analyze the strategy and 




10Antje Fritz, “Security Sector Governance in Georgia (I): Status,” in From Revolution to Reform: 
Georgia’s Struggle with Democratic Institution Building and Security Sector Reform, eds. Philipp H. Fluri 
and Eden Cole (Vienna, Austria: National Defence Academy and Bureau for Security Policy, in 
cooperation with the PfP Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes: Study Group 
Information, 2005a), 51. 
11Minister of Defense, “Ministry of Defense of Georgia/Policy,” www.mod.gov.ge. 
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Scholars such as Antje Fritz,12 Geoffrey Wright,13 and Duncan Hiscock,14 attempted to 
fill the lack of research on institutional developments, informal decision-making 
processes, and realistic situations behind the documents and official “show-cases.”15 
The existing literature indicates several phases and turning points in defense 
institution-building in Georgia. The first phase began after Georgia regained its 
independence and started state-building processes during the political, economic, and 
social chaos in the 1990s. The first signs of progressive developments for the GAF 
appeared after the 9/11 terrorist attacks when the U.S. shifted its foreign policy priorities, 
and intensified the fight against international terrorism.16 Consequently, the U.S.-assisted 
projects—the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP), and the Sustainment and 
Stability Operations Program (SSOP)17—began. The second phase, and turning point, 
was the governmental change after the 2003 Rose Revolution and the launch of wide-
ranging reforms oriented to NATO integration. The reforms process and defense 
institutional developments were underlined by official sources; however, the criticisms 
expressed in a few sources were validated by the weakness of Georgian defense 
institutions revealed during August of 2008. The war provided evidence for further 
research on the impeded reforms, and also revealed the broad spectrum of deficiencies of 
the ongoing reforms and institutional developments. There is even less literature on the 
most current trends and processes after the 2012 change in government and legislative 
12Fritz, “Security Sector Governance in Georgia (I): Status,” 51. 
13Geoffrey Wright, “Defense Reform and the Caucasus: Challenges of Institutional Reform during 
Unresolved Conflict,” Mediterranean Quarterly 20, no. 3 (July 2009), 19‒39, 
doi:http://dx.doi.org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.1215/10474552-2009-012. 
14Duncan Hiscock, “Impatient Reformers and Reignited Conflicts: The Case of Georgia,” in Security 
Sector Reform in Challenging Environments, eds. Hans Born and Albrecht Schnabe (Geneva: Geneva 
Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2009). 
15Wright, Defense Reform and the Caucasus: Challenges of Institutional Reform during Unresolved 
Conflict, 19‒39. 
16Peter Forster, The Paradox of Policy: American Interests in the Post-9/11 Caucasus (University 
Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University, 2004), 30‒31. 
17David Darchiashvili, “Georgian Security Sector Reform: Achievements and Failures,” in Security 
Sector Governance in Southern Caucasus: Challenges and Visions, eds. Anja H. Ebnöther and Gustav E. 
Gustenau (Vienna, Austria: National Defence Academy and Bureau for Security Policy, in cooperation 
with the PfP Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes: Study Group Information, 
2004), 95‒96. 
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authority, although the MoD is becoming more transparent by revealing its operational 
details. 
The first phase of the security sector development was extensively studied by 
Georgian scholars David Darchiashvili and Tamara Pataraia, and also by other scholars 
working for the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) and 
the Austrian Ministry of Defense. These scholars’ publications contributed to security 
sector reform and defense institution-building in the South Caucasian region.18 These 
publications incorporated several comprehensive analytical articles, including works by 
the Georgian scholars working in civil-military relations and defense institutions fields, 
such as Shorena Lortkipanidze, Tamara Pataraia, and TeonaAkubardia. 
David Darchiashvili is a well-known expert on defense institutions and civil-
military relations in Georgia, and has conducted invaluable and comprehensive 
research.19 He points out the deficiency of political culture and awareness of state 
building in societal and political circles. The causes of these deficiencies vary from the 
heavy impact of Soviet “nomenklatura” on political institutions, to the influence of pre-
Soviet poetry, older history and historical heroes, and the values of the Orthodox Church 
on social-cultural developments. The early defense institutions were referred to as 
paramilitary units. After the first multiparty elections of 1992, the newly established 
18Anja H. Ebnöther and Gustav E. Gustenau, eds., Security Sector Governance in Southern Caucasus: 
Challenges and Visions (Vienna, Austria: Bureau for Security Policy at the Austrian Ministry of 
Defence/DCAF/PfP-Consortium, 2004), http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/Security-Sector-Governance-in-
Southern-Caucasus-Challenges-and-Visions; Philipp H. Fluri and Eden Cole, eds., From Revolution to 
Reform: Georgia’s Struggle with Democratic Institution Building and Security Sector Reform (Vienna, 
Austria: National Defence Academy and Bureau for Security Policy, in cooperation with the PfP 
Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes: Study Group Information, 2005b); 
Philipp H. Fluri and Eden Cole, “Defence Institution Building 2005 Partnership Action Plan on Defence 
Institutions Building (PAP-DIB) Regional Conference for the Caucasus and Republic of Moldova” (Tbilisi, 
Georgia, April, 25, 2005a); Philipp Fluri and Viorel Cibotaru, Defence Institution Building: Country 
Profiles and Needs Assessments for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova Background Materials 
(Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2008); Tamara Pataraia, 
ed., Democratic Control of Armed Forces of Georgia since the August War 2008 (Geneva: Geneva Centre 
for Democratic Control Over the Armed Forces (DCAF), 2010). 
19David Darchiashvili, “Georgia: A Hostage to Arms,” in The Caucasus: Armed and Divided (United 
Kingdom: Saferworld, 2003); David Darchiashvili, “Georgian Defense Policy and Military Reform,” in 
Statehood and Security: Georgia After the Rose Revolution, eds. Bruno Coppieters and Robert Legvold. 
American Academy Studies in Global Security (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), 117‒154; Darchiashvili, 
“Georgian Security Sector Reform: Achievements and Failures;” Darchiashvili, Security Sector Reform in 
Georgia (Tbilisi, Georgia: Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development, 2008). 
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government created the first official military structures, which, according to 
Darchiashvili, suffered from many insufficiencies in command and control, discipline, 
procedural administration, financial, logistic, infrastructural resources, and 
professionalism, as well as in the understanding of mission and tasks, absence of 
conceptual framework, weak civilian control, corruption, weapons and equipment, and 
inherited conventional weapons from Soviet bases stationed on the country’s territory.20 
The literature by David Darchiashvili,21 Tamara Pataraia,22 Shorena 
Lortkpanidze,23 Daniel Hiscock,24 Robert Hamilton,25 Jim Nichol,26 and Geoffrey 
Wright27 emphasized a turning point in defense reforms after the change of government 
in 2004 and the setting of NATO integration as a foreign policy priority in Georgia’s 
political development agenda. The NATO integration process is actively discussed in the 
Georgian defense institution-building literature as the facilitator of security and defense 
reforms and democratic institution building. The analysis and criticism can be divided 
into two parts. One includes the formal and visible provisions and developments, and the 
other includes informal and invisible realities and “short cuts” that President Saakashvili 
and his government were criticized for as the most common way of doing business.28 
20Darchiashvili, “Georgian Defense Policy and Military Reform,” 117‒154. 
21Darchiashvili, Security Sector Reform in Georgia, 38. 
22Tamara Pataraia, “Defence Institution Building in Georgia,” in Defence Institution Building: 
Country Profiles and Needs Assessments for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova, eds. Philipp Fluri 
and ViorelCibotaru (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2008), 50. 
23Shorena Lortkipanidze, “After Revolution‒Toward Reform: the Georgian Security Sector Initiatives 
and Activities,” in From Revolution to Reform: Georgia’s Struggle with Democratic Institution Building 
and Security Sector Reform, eds. Philipp H. Fluri and Eden Cole (Vienna, Austria: National Defence 
Academy and Bureau for Security Policy, in cooperation with the PfP Consortium of Defence Academies 
and Security Studies Institutes: Study Group Information, 2005), 233‒234. 
24Hiscock, “Impatient Reformers,” 119.  
25Robert H. Hamilton, Georgian Military Reform – An Alternative View (Washington, DC: Center for 
Strategic & International Studies, 2009). 
26Jim Nichol, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. 
Interests (Washington, DC: United States Foreign Press Center, 2006), 16. 
27Wright, “Defense Reform and the Caucasus: Challenges of Institutional Reform during Unresolved 
Conflict,” 26.  
28Hiscock, “Impatient Reformers,” 17. 
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The writings by Darchiashvili,29 Pataraia,30 Lortkipanidze,31 and Akubardia32 
analyzed how Georgian legislation has established the legal framework of civilian control 
of the military. These authors also emphasize the relatively weak role of Parliament in 
comparison to the President as “responsible for every decision made by government.”33 
These researchers shared the same concern about the strong role of the President with 
other scholars such as Christofer Berglund,34 Thomas De Waal,35 Cornel and Nilsson.36 
When assessing Presidential power versus the weakness of the Parliament, all of these 
scholars indicate the signs of non-democratic parliamentary control,37 and tendencies of 
the shift from “rule of law (to) law of the ruler.”38 In Darchiashvili’s evaluation, the 
limitation of parliamentary control is exacerbated as the structural, functional, and 
procedural norms are set by bylaws such as presidential orders and internal regulations. 
In parallel, the scholar assumes that decision-making divisions between the President and 
the Parliament regarding the composition and structure of the armed forces can cause 
contradictions and delays.39 
29Darchiashvili, Security Sector Reform in Georgia, 38‒42. 
30Pataraia, “Defence Institution Building in Georgia,” 51‒54. 
31Shorena Lortkipanidze, “Parliamentary Oversight on the Security Sector: Mechanisms and Practice,” 
in Democratic Control of Armed Forces of Georgia since the August War 2008, ed. Tamara Pataraia 
(Geneva: Geneva Centre for Democratic Control Over the Armed Forces, 2010), 20‒24. 
32TeonaAkubardia, “Overview of Legislation Facilitating the Civil Democratic Oversight of Armed 
Forces in Georgia,” in Democratic Control of Armed Forces of Georgia since the August War 2008, ed. 
Tamara Pataraia (Geneva: Geneva Centre for Democratic Control Over the Armed Forces, 2010), 41‒43.  
33Pataraia, “Defence Institution Building in Georgia,” 53. 
34Christofer Berglund, “Georgia,” in The Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe, ed. S. 
Berglund et al., 3rd ed. (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013), 785. 
35Thomas De Waal, “Georgia’s Possible Future,” presented at Georgia’s Choices: Charting a Future 
in Uncertain Times, Brussels, Belgium on July 19, 2011, http:www.carnegieeurope.eu/2011/07/19/georg-s-
choices-charting-future-in-uncertain-times-bjz4  
36Svante E. Cornell and Niklas Nilsson,” Georgian Politics since the August 2008 War,” 
Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 17, no. 3 (July 2009), 251‒268. 
37Antje Fritz, “Security Sector Governance in Georgia (II): Achievements,” in From Revolution to 
Reform: Georgia`s Struggle with Democratic Institution Building and Security Sector Reform, eds. Philipp 
H. Fluri and Eden Cole (Vienna, Austria: National Defence Academy and Bureau for Security Policy, in 
cooperation with the PfP Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes: Study Group 
Information, 2005b), 129‒130. 
38Berglund, “Georgia,” 789‒790. 
39Darchiashvili, “Georgian Security Sector Reform: Achievements and Failures,” 101. 
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Another concern these scholars expressed when analyzing the legislation is 
related to the process of defense budgeting and the definition of state secrets that are 
related to transparency issues. The issues of transparency are best analyzed in the reports 
developed by the organization Transparency International, which emphasizes the 
insufficient openness of defense institutions and requires that more detailed information 
be available for the public, as supportive of public investments and better engagements in 
civilian democratic control of decision-making processes.40 
Challenges for defense institution developments are rooted in insufficient 
legislature and exacerbated by the large number of varying factors, such as lack of 
conceptual implementation plans and capabilities, and the absence of ‘political will’ to 
reform. While discussing and analyzing the legislation and concepts, the majority of 
literature, including the previously mentioned most recent works of Akubardia and 
Lortkipanidze, lacks the information on processes and procedures of instructional 
developments and decision making.  
Discussing defense institutions before the governmental change, Fritz,41 
Pataraia,42 and Darchiashvili43 emphasize the absence of main concepts and strategy of 
defense and security, the high rate of corruption, and the poor condition of the armed 
forces due to insufficient financial resources. Although these challenges were overcome, 
the impediments for reforms and institutional developments, such as political will, 
cultural mentality, and relationship factors dominating the laws and regulations that were 
revealed by Fritz in 2004, appear to remain according to the literature,44 which criticizes 
the dark side of Saakashvili’s reforms. The value added to the research conducted by 
Fritz came from the individual interviews with the staff working in the institutions, which 
supplemented the scarcity of primary sources and gave deep insight into the situation 
which was invisible from the outside. These challenges explored by the author—
40Reform of Georgia`s Defence Sector (Tbilisi, Georgia: Transparency International Georgia, 2007). 
41Fritz, “Security Sector Governance in Georgia (I): Status,” 59‒61. 
42Pataraia, “Defence Institution Building in Georgia,” 16. 
43Darchiashvili, “Georgian Defense Policy and Military Reform,” 117‒154. 
44Hiscock, “Impatient Reformers,” 16; Wright, “Defense Reform and the Caucasus: Challenges of 
Institutional Reform during Unresolved Conflict,” 39. 
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corrupted system, political goodwill, personal power-oriented/centered attitude, law 
awareness and request of democratic control from public, insufficient capabilities of 
Parliament, clannish and clientele attitudes—were shading the regulations and decision 
making. Fritz states that “most experts agreed that it is not a lack of expertise or 
experience, but the absence of political will that prevents the implementation of a 
national security strategy” and “the serious progress of the reforms,”45 which seems to be 
valid as many officers or civilians have the opportunity to become educated and trained 
in U.S. and European institutions. Hiscock also criticizes the reforms, as he sees them as 
“sketchy, without deliberate preparation, shared and understood only by a small number 
of people, and lacking the capabilities of ongoing changes to be institutionalized.”46 
The paradox of presidential dominancy over the Parliament as a security sector 
was even more detrimental in practice as the President had strong personal involvement 
and interference in practically all institutions,47 including defense.48 As evaluated by 
Fritz in 2004, the depth of the system, “which is determined by personal relationships, 
rather than by well-defined democratic procedures,”49 remains valid and is emphasized in 
later literature, despite multiple reforms and changes in government. In general, all 
previously mentioned critics point out that there is a the lack of civilian expertise and 
legally-supported role of the President, as well as a misuse of international assistance, 
budgeting problems, lack of transparency, and weak public involvement and 
engagement.50 
The 2008 August War revealed the areas of weakness of the Georgian defense, 
and has become the source of analysis and evaluation by the U.S. Congressional 
Research Service and other scholars such as Robert Hamilton. 
45Fritz, “Security Sector Governance in Georgia (I): Status,” 62. 
46Hiscock, “Impatient Reformers,” 135. 
47Nicole Gallina, “Puzzles in State Transformation: Armenia and Georgia,” Caucasian Review of 
International Affairs 4, no. 1 (Winter, 2010), 30. 
48Berglund, “Georgia,” 23. 
49Fritz, “Security Sector Governance in Georgia (II): Achievements,” 119. 
50Berglund, “Georgia;” Wright, “Defense Reform and the Caucasus: Challenges of Institutional 
Reform during Unresolved Conflict;” Hiscock, “Impatient Reformers.” 
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Defense institutions were examined after the 2008 August War, but these 
academic works were heavily influenced by political affiliations, and the assessments 
may have deviated toward political preferences. Even so, the evaluations offered by the 
U.S. Congressional Research Service emphasize the shortfalls of defense institutions. 
Additionally, official Georgian sources, such as the Georgia Defense Conference 
proceedings or the Strategic Defense Reviews, are continuously accentuating planning 
phases while permanently postponing the implementation of plans. It is obvious that 
defense institution-building and GAF reforms, even as they are conceptualized and 
planned, are not fully progressing.  
While previously mentioned scholars discuss general political developments and 
institution-building trends and facets that can be applied to the defense, U.S.-based 
scholarly work—based on the practical experience of working with defense sector 
development in Georgia (Hamilton,51 Mangum and Craven52)—emphasizes specific 
defense institutions. Although Mangum and Craven are more focused on general 
concepts of optimal defense structure and developments—rather than current status 
assessment—their work can be used for general recommendations. Robert Hamilton 
provides more comprehensive analysis of and offers direction to the Georgian defense 
reform process. Hamilton criticizes the New York Times article by C. J. Chivers and 
Thom Shnaker,53 who point out high centralization; impulsive decision making; 
ineffective, unclear command and control; and biased personnel-related decisions in 
higher positions in defense institutions and military command. Hamilton agrees to the 
areas of deficiency, but claims that these assessments lack the understanding of context, 
such as the relatively short history of the institution, constrained finances, and the large 
number of reforms that the Georgian defense has achieved in a short period of time.54 
51Hamilton, “Georgian Military Reform – An Alternative View.” 
52Ronald S. Mangum and William Craven, “Measuring Defense Reform,” Small Wars Journal 5 
(2010). 
53C. J. Chivers and Thom Shnaker, “Georgia Lags in its Bid to Fix Army,” New York Times, 
December 17, 2008. 
54Hamilton, “Georgian Military Reform – an Alternative View.” 
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Defense institutions and armed forces development features are also discussed in 
Russian-based academic works, whose critiques can be assessed as fair in terms of 
institutional effectiveness, but are heavily influenced by political affiliation.55 These 
scholars neglect Georgia’s defense reform’s aim toward NATO integration, but point out 
the Saakashvili government’s intentions to use force to restore Georgia’s territorial 
integrity. In addition, Russian-based scholars provide unidentified “Internet reports”56 to 
emphasize unprofessionalism, undisciplined performance, poor training, and negligence 
to learn within Georgian Armed Forces. 
Even fewer sources are available on the use of well-organized personnel 
management as the demonstration of broader defense institution building. Although the 
literature recognizes the importance of personnel management in institutions, and 
especially in defense contexts, it emphasizes the lack of policy, long-term vision, 
planning, and implementing of personnel management. Darchiashvili’s work describes 
the low trust from the society toward a military servant before the reforms. The 
improvement of attitudes is obvious from society and from the civilian leadership, as the 
personnel management and training systems are being reformed. Although as the reports 
show, further improvements are needed in terms of management, rights, and 
responsibilities of the military servants.57 In the opposition to SDR in 2007, sources 
revealed the ambiguity of manpower plans in long-term perspectives, highlighted the 
planned downsizing of manpower by approximately 10,000 in order to have smaller but 
better equipped and trained armed forces, and displayed the increased number of 
personnel.58 Fully transitioning to the all-volunteer forces (AVFs) that were represented 
in the 2007 SDR is still in the MoD agenda and still under financial calculation during 
2013–2014.59 
55Paul Holtom, “Tanki Augusta: SbornikStatei (Tanks of August: A Collection of Articles), by 
Barabanov, Mikhail, Lavrov, Anton, and Tseluiko, Viacheslav,” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 23, 
no. 4 (November 2010), doi:10.1080/13518046.2010.538331. 
56 Paul Holtom, “Tanki Augusta,” 13. 
57Reform of Georgia’s Defence Sector, Transparency International, Georgia. 
58Hiscock, “Impatient Reformers,” 123. 
59Alasania, Irakli, Minister of Defense of Georgia, Minister’s Vision 2013‒2014 (Tbilisi, Georgia: 
Ministry of Defense of Georgia, 2013). 
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Eastern European states, due to their former efforts for the integration into the 
Euro-Atlantic space and similar patterns of socialist and soviet past, provide relevant 
examples and studies for comparative analysis and lessons learned for Georgia. The 
number of authors discussing new NATO member country defense reforms60 emphasizes 
the role of NATO integration for reforms and institution building in Slovenia, Poland, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Estonia and Latvia.61 Some authors even indicate 
that after integration reforms, the pace has slowed, and at some point the focus was lost 
for the political decision makers after integration due to “the lack of ‘carrots and 
sticks.’”62 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis uses several methods in its research and analysis, including historical, 
comparative, and case studies to prove the hypothesis related to parliamentary oversight, 
political interference, and professional expertise, and to answer the central question. It 
focuses on studying the defense institution-building and explores how these institutions 
have been established and developed. Toward this goal, it relies mostly on historical 
sources. The history of defense institutions will be analyzed from an institution-building 
perspective, and will show how historical background and developments affected the 
organizational culture and the structure of the institutions we have today.  
A comparative study method is used to compare the defense institution-building 
in Georgia with the practice of the new NATO countries that at some point shared similar 
historical background, and have provided a foundation for the NATO integration. These 
countries include new NATO members and former Soviet or Socialist Bloc states. Study 
60Istvan Gyarmati and Theodor Winkler, eds., Post-Cold War Defense Reforms; Lessons Learned in 
Europe and the United States (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2002); Simon, Hungary and NATO Problems in 
Civil-Military Relations; Alexandra Gheciu, NATO in the “New Europe”: The Politics of International 
Socialization After the Cold War (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2005). 
61Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military 
Relations (New York: Routledge, 2012). 
62Florina Cristiana Matei, “NATO, the Demand for Democratic Control, and Military Effectiveness 
Romania,” in The Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations, eds. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina 
Cristiana Matei (New York: Routledge, 2012), 328. 
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focuses on the features of institutional developments, and not on the states, when 
comparing their unique way of development.  
Finally, this thesis studies the case of manpower management to narrow the focus 
from the broad lenses of institution building. The focus on personnel management was 
chosen to accurately reflect all processes and challenges of defense institution building. 
In addition, the author would like to build in personal experience and expertise.  
The research uses primary and secondary sources. Primary sources are related to 
national legislation, such as the Constitution, Defense Law, laws regarding status of 
military servants, Defense Planning Law, Defense Minister’s orders, and conceptual 
documents, such as the National Security Concept, National Military Strategy, Minister`s 
Visions, Strategic Defense Reviews, and policy concepts developed in the MoD. In 
addition, the author’s personal experience in defense reforms as a member of the 
Interagency Commission on SDR is used.63 To analyze the effectiveness of defense 
institution building, the study uses the research of Georgian and foreign scholars 
regarding literature review processes.  
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The Introduction (Chapter I) states the major research question, importance of the 
topic, problems and hypotheses; briefly discusses the primary and secondary research 
sources; and outlines the overall thesis structure.  
Chapter II discusses the early stages of defense institution building, the 
establishment of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, and the chaos caused by 
multiple military and paramilitary groups. This chapter discusses the political, 
institutional, financial, and cultural challenges the institutions faced during the beginning 
stages. Existing shortfalls and impediments are analyzed in the case of personnel 
management, revealing how corruption, scarce resources, and poor decision making 
affected the manpower management from the organizational perspective.   
63Saakashvili Mikheil, Order # 372 of the President of Georgia, September 7, 2004 on establishment 
of Interagency Commission on elaboration of Strategic Defense Review, 
https://matsne.gov.ge/index.php?option=com_ldmssearch&view=docView&id=95380 
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Chapter III discusses the reforms begun after the new government took a clearly 
demonstrated course toward NATO integration in 2003 This included establishing 
defense institutions to ensure national security, cooperating with NATO, and contributing 
to international security. The chapter introduces and analyzes transformation processes 
that were facilitated by the NATO integration aspiration. These processes are also 
demonstrated by personnel management cases that reflect the general situation, 
challenges, and developments.  
Chapter IV presents a comparative analysis of Eastern and Central European 
practices of defense institution-building and the NATO partnership. The processes and 
perceptions are discussed and analyzed from the perspective of the similarities of 
challenges. 
Chapter V provides an analysis of the challenges the defense institutions faced at 
the early stages and after the “Rose Revolution” governmental changes. Early stages 
challenges such as insufficient legislation, financial constraints and corruption, Soviet 
type administration, and lack of professionalism are discussed as the background. 
Afterwards, the chapter discusses the institutional challenges, such as weak parliamentary 
oversight, political interference, and lack of professionalism, which became more 
obvious when the early stage challenges were more or less overcome.  
 18 
II. EARLY STAGES OF GEORGIAN DEFENSE INSTITUTION 
BUILDING, 1991–2003 
This chapter discusses the early developments and challenges of defense 
institution-building from the 1990s up to the 2003 “Rose Revolution.” The relevant 
political, economic, and socio-cultural features of this moment shaped not only 
institutional development processes highlighted in the next section, but also personnel 
policies and “patterns of relationships” in defense institutions and are analyzed here in 
detail.64 
A. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
Defense institution-building as a part of state building is closely related with and 
impacted by political, economic, and socio-cultural developments in government, in 
society, and in the heritage of the armed forces themselves. Instability and immaturity of 
all the three aspects shaped Georgian defense institutions from the preliminary stages, 
where the impact of the Soviet system as well as very formidable security challenges of a 
distressing nature imposed themselves at the outset.  
At the early stages, political challenges affecting defense institution-building were 
multiple. During the Soviet era, Georgia strived for independence, and all underground 
national movements were focused on this goal. After gaining independence, former 
dissident political activists found the people’s broad support in elections. However, the 
new government, due to its lack of knowledge and understanding of the modern state and 
democratic principles, failed to establish democratic state institutions.65 From the defense 
institutions perspective, widespread unfamiliarity with the principles of democratic civil-
military relations, such as that found in the Atlantic region, largely impeded the 
establishment of the institution that would be accountable to the public and able to 
64Darchiashvili, “Georgian Defense Policy and Military Reform,” 117. 
65Dov Lynch, “Georgia: An Emerging Governance: Problems and Prospects,” in From Revolution to 
Reform: Georgia’s Struggle with Democratic Institution Building and Security Sector Reform, eds. Philipp 
H. Fluri and Eden Cole (Geneva: Geneva Centre for Democratic Control over the Armed Forces, 2005), 
249‒268, 251‒252. 
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exercise oversight over the armed forces. In addition, newly established defense 
institutions struggled with Soviet institutional legacy and Russia’s attempts to maintain 
its influence. Political challenge was also to determine the defense development 
direction: either pro-Russian, wanting to strengthen ties within the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS), or pro-Western, seeking participation in the NATO Partnership 
for Peace Program (PfP).66 
Soviet institutional legacy played its role.67 Institutions in the independent 
Georgia still functioned almost identically to the “Soviet nomenklatura.” That was as a 
highly centralized institution in which decision making and authority were concentrated 
among a small number of individuals, the delegation of authority was absent or 
informally included the people falling into the patronage network, and the members (i.e., 
staff only were allowed to follow the rules set by those who had authority). As Jonathan 
Wheatley summarizes, the “nomenklatura” “was characterized by rule-breaking, 
dissimulation, corruption, clientelism, indifference toward the affairs of ordinary citizens, 
and an extreme degree of dependency on superiors.”68 
The newly independent country, which lacked natural resources, failed to 
transition successfully to a market economy and create economic development 
conditions.69 A failing economy created the extreme deficiency of financial and logistic 
resources needed for defense institutions, and encouraged the corruption and illegal 
activities by the people with guns.70 
As a young and inexperienced state in the shadow of war, Georgia also struggled 
to establish democracy-based national values. Georgian national identity, with its legacy 
from Greco antiquity and Orthodox Christianity deeply rooted in the country’s history, 
66Darchiashvili, The Army-Building and Security Problems in Georgia, 22‒24. 
67Stephen F. Jones, “Democracy from Below? Interest Groups in Georgian Society,” Slavic Review 
(2000), 42‒73, 66‒67. 
68Jonathan Wheatley, Georgia from National Awakening to Rose Revolution: Delayed Transition in 
the Former Soviet Union (Post-Soviet Politics) (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2005), 23. 
69Archil Gegeshidze, “Georgia: In Quest of a Niche Strategy,” The Quarterly Journal, no. 3 (2002), 
3‒12; Nicole Gallina, “Puzzles in State Transformation: Armenia and Georgia,” Caucasian Review of 
International Affairs 4, no. 1 (Winter 2010), 32. 
70Darchiashvili, “Georgian Security Sector Reform: Achievements and Failures,” 110. 
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shaped the independent movements during the Soviet era. Despite independence and the 
establishment of Georgia as a sovereign country, the shift of values appeared hard. Due to 
the lack of knowledge of the values and principles of democracy and modern statehood, 
most politicians and citizens were still focused on national and ethnic identity. Such 
socio-cultural perceptions restrained defense institutions from developing democratic 
oversight and public accountability.71 
Finally, security challenges emerged after independence which impeded 
democratization and institutional developments.72 Ethnic conflicts broke out in Georgian 
territory—Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Political, economic, and military support from 
Russia enabled Abkhazian and South Ossetian separatist forces to establish their own 
regimes in both regions of Georgia, and the country still struggles for territorial integrity. 
Such situations had and still have profound negative effect on defense institution 
building73 and Georgia’s integration into the Euro-Atlantic space.74 
B. DEFENSE INSTITUTIONS AT THE STAGE OF ESTABLISHMENT 
At the beginning stage and also for a long time after, state institutions in Georgia 
were challenged by the common unawareness of modern state requirements and the 
heavy influence of the Soviet legacy. After independence from the USSR in 1991, 
Georgia struggled to set up state institutions and establish control over different armed 
groups which were emerging in the 1980s when political activists mobilized the national 
independent movement against Soviet authority. In 1990, when the USSR still existed, 
the country managed to conduct the first multiparty elections and create the first post-
Communist legislative body, the Supreme Council. 
71Darchiashvili, “Georgian Defense Policy and Military Reform,” 118‒120. 
72Ghia Nodia, “Dynamics of State-Building in Georgia,” Demokratizatsiya 6, no. 1 (1998); Berglund, 
“Georgia,” in The Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe, ed. S. Berglund et al., 3rd ed. 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013), 5. 
73Pataraia, “Defence Institution Building in Georgia,” 71; Darchiashvili, “Georgian Defense Policy 
and Military Reform,” 120. 
74Karl-Heinz Kamp, “NATO Enlargement Reloaded,” Research Paper, NATO Research Directorate 
81 (2012). 
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At the beginning of the 1990s it was “impossible even to imagine having 
Georgian military forces;” therefore, such groups existed only as non-formal paramilitary 
groupings commanded by public or political entities or individuals.75 They were not 
subordinate to the newly established political authority and were chaotic, poorly 
missioned, and poorly managed. The first attempt to organize existing armed groupings 
and constrain their activities within a legal framework was the “Law on Internal Troops – 
National Guard” approved in December 1990 by the Georgian Supreme Council. By this 
law the new government created its first official military structure—the National Guard, 
which, as it is argued, was still a paramilitary unit due to its name, mission, and 
subordination.76 
The National Guard fell under the Ministry of Interior and was responsible for the 
public order and territorial integrity. Clearly the new organization had embraced missions 
with two very different functions. Even though the paramilitary nature and diverging 
missions of the new institution at first glance emphasized the government’s political 
unawareness, scholars see deeper political reasons behind it. As Darchiashvili posits, 
having such paramilitary groupings was the best solution in the existing political and 
security situation. As Georgia was still part of the Soviet Union, the establishment of 
military forces would provoke Soviet authorities and also would threaten and exacerbate 
emerging separatist movements in autonomous regions.77 
The National Guard, despite its vague mission and objectives of defending public 
order, was seen as the military service by the Georgian population. The National Guard 
also incorporated in it all the existing military groupings. It became very popular among 
the officers previously serving in Soviet Army and also among young Georgians to join 
the National Guard. Mostly their enthusiasm was based on intensified feelings of national 
identity. Based on the two years’ compulsory service, the National Guard counted 12,000 
75Levan Alapishvili, “The Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Control on Armed Forces in 
Caucasus Region: A Comparative Study,” NATO Publications (1995), 16‒17, 
http://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/97-99/alapishvili.pdf. 
76Darchiashvili, “Georgian Defense Policy and Military Reform,” 123. 
77Ibid., 117. 
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personnel in 1991.78 However, this enthusiasm evaporated very soon due to National 
Guard’s quick fall in the prestige and legitimacy and the hard conditions of service. 
Consequently, the rate of evasion and desertion increased significantly.79 
In 1991, Georgia declared its independence and elected its first President—Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia, former chairman of the Supreme Council. Trying to strengthen his 
position, President Gamsakhurdia appointed his personal friend as the Head of the 
National Guard; however, the President soon lost influence and control over the National 
Guard. Later, the National Guard was transformed into more of a bandit-type of 
organization, conducting violations, such as hijacking cars and engaging in illegal arms 
trade with the Russian military units located on Georgian territory.80 
The Ministry of Defense had been established on September 9, 1991; but as 
Darchiashvili argues, the newly established institution had only one function—providing 
logistical support to the National Guard. Gamsakhurdia’s failed attempt at control of 
highly influential military groups, together with the rough political transition, indeed 
created a “chaotic pattern of civil-military relations” and contributed to the military 
coup.81 The coup brought a change of government, and Eduard Shevardnadze, who in the 
past had served as Foreign Affairs Minister in the USSR, was later elected as the second 
President of Georgia.  
In 1992 Georgia inherited conventional weapons and materiel from Soviet bases 
stationed on the country’s territory. But still, “Shevardnadze was a leader of the state with 
no army.”82 Reorganization of military units had started with the establishment of the 
11th Army Brigade, and the National Guard became the Rapid Reaction Force under the 
Ministry of Defense. Although, as Lynch argues, any change and reform in power 
78Ibid., 124.  
79Lynch, “Georgia: An Emerging Governance: Problems and Prospects,” 251. 
80Wheatley, “Georgia from National Awakening to Rose Revolution,” 54. 
81Darchiashvili, “Georgian Defense Policy and Military Reform,” 124‒125.  
82 Jesse Driscoll, “Inside the Leviathan: Coup-Proofing After State Failure” (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Stanford University, 2008), https://politicalscience.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/workshop-
materials/cp_driscoll.pdf,  23. 
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institutions which were distorted by Soviet legacy was almost impossible.83 In reality, the 
army was still disorganized and undisciplined, command and procedural administration 
was disordered, commanders were more like warlords, and democratic civilian oversight 
on any sound basis did not exist.84 The decisions in the Ministry were made 
spontaneously, without a conceptual and planning basis.85 Ministers and deputies were 
granted the full and independent authority to hire or dismiss personnel, including military 
personnel. Based on his personal interviews and observations, Driscoll argues that 
“warlords could thus formalize their patron relationships with their subordinate clients, 
and new recruits into the police and military could be screened for personal loyalty to a 
particular militia faction.”86 Darchiashvili mentions the press conference when the 
Defense Minister declared that neither the President nor the Parliament but the “people” 
and the army are to decide the appointment and dismissal of the Defense Minister.87 
President Shevardnadze managed to maintain weak control over the military and 
get rid of the influential military leaders, mainly due to his personal influence. 
Darchiashvili sees Shevardnadze’s influence in the broad perception of him as the only 
person guaranteeing international image and support.88Although Driscoll argues that 
Shevardnadze’s main pillars to exercise his personal control over armed structures and 
power ministries were his involvement in career promotions of young mid-career officers 
to achieve guaranteed support from them, frequent shuffles of these increasingly 
influential officers, and “overlapping mandates” and vague missions between the power 
structures.89 Obviously, Eduard Shevardnadze using his Soviet experience was able to 
83Lynch, “Georgia: An Emerging Governance: Problems and Prospects,” 249‒267. 
84Darchiashvili, The Army Building and Security Problems in Georgia, 33‒34 
85Richard Wolff, “The Armed Forces of Georgia‒an Update,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (1994): 
559‒561. 
86Driscoll, “Inside the Leviathan,” 25. 
87Darchiashvili (1997) based on Georgian newspaper Shvidi Dge (Seven Days) no. 16 (April 30–May 
3, 1993), “The Search of Georgia State Security,” Caucasus Working Papers, The Center for International 
Security and Arms Control, Stanford University. Available http://iis-
db.stanford.edu/pubs/10255/caucasus.pdf. 
88Darchiashvili, “Georgian Defense Policy and Military Reform,” 128. 
89Driscoll, “Inside the Leviathan,” 26. 
 24 
                                                 
establish and implement his personal control by ignoring national objectives which were 
to establish strong democratic institutions. 
The formation of the Army as a new institution was possible from 1995, when all 
existing paramilitary and armed groups were disbanded and the Russian-supported 
Minister of Internal Security had to escape from Georgia after the unsuccessful 
assassination attempt on the President. Still, the newly established army and Ministry of 
Defense were under heavy influence from the Russian political and military elite90 and 
suffering from demoralization after their defeat in the war in Abkhazia in 1993. 
Shevardnadze did not take any radical measures in response to the defeat in Abkhazia; 
rather, he just appointed a new head of General Staff. In addition, with the broad shadow 
of Russia’s interference into the conflict and support to separatist regimes, the defense 
institution failed to observe and analyze its own weaknesses, failures in command and 
control, and operational deficiencies and tactical incompetence.91 
In the period of 1993‒98, internal battles in the Ministry of Defense and the 
General staff, as on the national level, mainly related to the direction of the development 
of the armed forces. These battles and instances of revenge included high officials 
charged in decision making. In 1993, President Shevardnadze appointed Soviet General 
Vardiko Nadibaidze as the Minister of Defense. General Nadibaidze’s career included 
high positions in the Soviet and post-Soviet Russian Armed Forces. Scholars emphasize 
the impact of Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s visit in Tbilisi on this decision. By this 
decision Moscow seemed more relieved, as it saw Nadibaidze as the guarantor of the pro-
Russian direction of the Georgian army.9293 
According to the Georgian newspapers, Shevardnadze also was trying to get the 
Russian military assets located on Georgian territory by using Nadibaidze’s personal 
links with Russian military (especially Defense Minister Grachev).94 Certainly, 
90Driscoll, “Inside the Leviathan,” 253. 
91Ibid., 253. 
92Wolff, “The Armed Forces of Georgia‒an Update,” 559. 
93 Ibid. 
94Shvidi dge (7 days) [Georgian newspaper], March 13, 1998. 
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Nadibaidze had been able to sketch the ministry as an institution, although heavily based 
on Soviet tradition, and had “displayed leadership and an acute grasp of military 
affairs.”95 Consequently, his Ministry of Defense was heavily staffed by Soviet or 
Russian educated military personnel and relied heavily on Russian assistance in the 
creation of a “highly motivated professional army and an effective senior command and 
control system.”96 Indeed, any attempts to establish a professional army or defense 
institution were impeded by corruption, the scarceness of resources, absence of a 
conceptual framework, weak civilian control,97 and lack of education in military and 
security fields. The fact that Russia was willing to assist Georgia in educating Georgian 
officers in Russian military schools was based on Russia’s intentions to retain its 
influence on the Georgian military elite. In 1993‒94 more than 300 Georgian officers and 
cadets received such training.98 
From 1998 onwards, Georgia officially declared its Western orientation, 
withdrawal from the Collective Security Treaty, and its desire to join NATO from the 
foundation of Partnership for Peace, which the country joined in 1994. At the same time, 
NATO moved into high gear with the accession of its first new Central European 
members. This decision on Western orientation became the turning point for the GAF and 
Ministry of Defense as it created new requirements to adopt and move Georgian defense 
institutions and armed forces toward NATO compatibility. Accordingly, Shevardnadze 
dismissed Defense Minister Nadibaidze. Also in this realm, in 1998, Georgia extended an 
invitation to the International Security Advisory Board (ISAB), which had had previous 
successful experience in the Baltic States.99 It is noteworthy that the head of the 
Parliamentary Committee on Defense and Security, Revaz Adamia, who was well known 
by his preferences for NATO and Western institutions, played an important role in 
95 Wolff, “The Armed Forces of Georgia‒An Update,” 560. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Darchiashvili, “Georgian Defense Policy and Military Reform,” 133. 
98 Wolff, “The Armed Forces of Georgia‒An Update,” 560. 
99 International Security Advisory Board (ISAB). “ISAB Report” (2006), 
http://gfsis.org/media/download/GSAC/resources/ISAB_REPORT_2006.pdf. 
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inviting and supporting ISAB’s work in Georgia.100 However, he used his personality 
more than the agency itself to influence the President to receive them.  
ISAB’s focus included advice on how to establish an effective resource 
management system. Parallel to ISAB, the U.S. also assisted in introducing and setting up 
a new resource management system. The recently established Resource Management 
Department met numerous internal and external challenges, especially in regard to 
Planning Programming Budgeting System (PPBS) development. Internal challenges were 
basically a lack of knowledge and understanding, and resistance to change. The new 
department, despite the huge support from foreign advisors (including the U.S. and UK) 
had been through tough disputes not only in the department, but also in the ministry. The 
main problem was that the new system considered the establishment of transparent 
budgeting procedures and was limiting the possibilities of corruption.101 
External challenges appeared more powerful and the first program-based budget 
failed in parliamentary hearings due to the disagreement between MoD and Ministry of 
Finances (MoF). Moreover, MoF was able to cut the defense budget by about half. As the 
implementation of the new resource management system failed, the agency continued 
budgetary processes according to the old Soviet way, which was feeding the existing 
corruption.  
The first real steps were taken toward modernization after 9/11 when the U.S.-
assisted programs started in a more direct manner. At this stage with the absence of, or 
only nominal, democratic civilian control, military commanders in the ministry as in the 
General Staff were “as warlords and indifferent to civilian leadership.” As Darchiashvili 
puts it, “one of the most tangible of the Shevardnadze government’s inconsistent steps 
toward military reform”102 was the launch of the U.S.-assisted Georgian Train and Equip 
Program (GTEP). The increase of U.S. assistance to Georgia and interest in the region 
was related to the U.S. global war on terrorism started after 9/11. As the outcome of 
100 Shvidi Dge (7 days) [Georgian newspaper], March 13, 1998. 
101 Fritz, “Security Sector Governance in Georgia (I) Status,” 66‒67 
102Darchiashvili, “Georgia Defense Policy and Military Reform,”132. 
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GTEP, four trained and equipped battalions were able to conduct counterinsurgency and 
antiterrorist warfare operations. In the summer of 2003, GTEP proved to be successful as 
the Georgian military effectively accomplished an antiterrorist operation in Pankisi Gorge 
of Georgia103 and later in multinational coalition operations in Iraq.104 
1. Personnel Management at Early Stages 
Despite the fact that Georgia did not have a large number of military officers 
serving in the USSR Army,105 personnel management as well as institutional 
arrangements were heavily influenced by the Soviet legacy and was understood as 
centralized administration. Personnel management appeared hard to reform even after the 
change of political system and eradication of corruption. Therefore, it has been a subject 
of harsh critique for decades. Western human resources practices consider established 
policy, planning, standards and procedures for recruitment, strength management, 
promotion, and professional and career development. Such organization does not leave 
much space for personal or politically-biased decisions either in military or civilian 
personnel management in defense institutions.  
In the first decade of the new defense institutions, corruption, financial resource 
scarcity, and the absence of policy, strategy, and knowledge on modern management, 
backed by a Soviet-inherited mentality, were the most visible challenges. In the 1990s, 
the only mechanisms to arrange recruiting and manning of armed forces was legislation. 
The “Law on Universal Military Service” obligated all 18-year-old male citizens in 
Georgia for two years of military service with exceptions on acceptance of alternative 
service based on religious beliefs. Professional military service was only considered for 
officers, and non-commissioned officers’ corps did not exist. All positions in the Ministry 
of Defense were military no matter whether or not the job required military skills. The 
positions, according to the “organizational table,” had a “rank ceiling,” usually with the 
103 Steven Lee Myers, “Georgia: Region Under Control,” New York Times, September 3, 2002, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/03/world/world-briefing-europe-georgia-region-under-control.html 
104Andrew E. Kramer, “Georgia Becomes an Unlikely U.S. Ally in Iraq,” New York Times, October 8, 
2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/08/news/08iht-ally.4.7803155.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
105Jesse Paul Lehrke, The Transition to National Armies in the Former Soviet Republics, 1988–2005 
(New York: Routledge, 2013), 145. 
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highest officer’s rank being colonel. There were no limitations on or margins of the 
lowest rank that could be appointed to the position. So the lowest military rank of junior 
lieutenant could be appointed with the appointed maximum rank of colonel and could 
stay in position until reaching the rank of colonel. In addition there were no policies and 
requirements for professional development, and the next higher rank was up to the 
length-in-service or commander’s will.  
Institutional problems resulted from such a system as there was no systematic 
performance evaluation. Thus, there was no reliable method to select the best performers 
for promotion, to improve performance, or plan development, and initiative was not 
required or appreciated adequately. Such a system also attached people to the positions 
and created space for individually-biased decisions in assignments, promotions, and 
dismissal of staff.   
Another personnel-related institutional problem was ambiguity regarding the 
number of personnel. Although the sources identify the number of personnel based on 
official information, the real number of personnel actually serving in the armed forces is 
hard to identify. There were actually serving personnel and personnel assigned to certain 
positions who never appeared at military units or performed any duty—so-called “dead 
souls.” The problem of “dead souls to justify funding requests for food and clothing”106 
existed until 2004. The benefit of having “dead souls” for the commander was funding 
for clothing, food, and salary, and the benefit for the person (“dead soul”) was getting a 
military ID (especially identifying him in a high position on General Staff). This ID could 
be used to “cover” his personal business from criminals. In 2004 as part of the reforms 
started, a special commission had to visit each military unit to count, register, and issue 
digital IDs to all who were present and actually performing their duties.107 
106Darchiashvili, “Georgia Defense Policy and Military Reform,” 137. 
107 As a member of Strategic Defense Review Commission, we reported about these activities.  
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Apparently, all previously mentioned features of personnel management 
negatively affected the image of the military servant in society. They often were tied to 
violence and therefore were not much trusted or respected.108 
C. CONCLUSION 
To summarize the security and defense environment of which defense institutions 
were part in post-Soviet Georgia in this first epoch of such reform, Darchiashvili’s work 
can be quoted:  
The state is weak, organized crime is widespread, ethnic conflicts remain 
unresolved, and the public has little trust in the government security 
agencies. State bodies are woefully under-funded, and this encourages 
corruption, as officers supplement their income through bribery and 
coercion; meanwhile, government ministries have various economic 
interests which provide extra-budgetary revenue. The Georgian security 
sector suffers from weakly coordinated and overlapping roles and remits. 
Although the idea of political control over the military and security sectors 
is recognized in principle, in practice much of the relevant legislation is 
largely declaratory, with little real impact on the ground.109 
This general overview of the security field is applicable to the Ministry of 
Defense as well as to the armed forces. Financial constraints limited the satisfaction of 
even such basic needs in military units, as food, uniforms, equipment, training, and living 
and training infrastructure. The General Staff and the Ministry of Defense suffered from 
the shortage of electricity, computers, office supplies, Internet access, heating, etc. 
Corruption and bribery were part of the system and everyday working routine. At the 
same time, however, young officers were making great efforts to utilize their knowledge 
and capabilities to perform their jobs. They were intensively learning from partners and 
108Darchiashvili, “Georgia Defense Policy and Military Reform,” 139‒140. 
109Darchiashvili, “Georgia: A Hostage to Arms in The Caucasus: Armed and Divided,” 1.  
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supporting the slow path of the reforms.110 The core was their understanding of the need 
for the reforms.  
In parallel with the previously mentioned shortages of food, equipment, finances, 
training, working and social conditions, personnel management was challenged by 
Soviet-type bureaucracies, which in reality delayed and disorganized the administering of 
orders regarding assignments, promotions, leaves, and dismissals. The total number of 
manpower at that time was hard to define because of existing of “dead souls” or  
“ghosts.”111 Assignments and promotions were not transparent, fair, and standardized.112 
No concept and policy documents were available, only disciplinary codes and 
administrative guidelines, to “manage” manpower. In these circumstances, the desire for 
NATO integration appeared the most realistic way of development.  
  
110I have been working in the Ministry of Defense since 1999. It was a newly established department 
and we had to start everything from zero with 20 people and three computers. In winter we were heating 
the office with handmade heaters brought from our homes. As a rule, I, as almost all my colleagues, have 
never left the office before 10 p.m. The monthly salary was equivalent to $40, which was not enough for 
public transportation during the month, and even that amount was rarely paid. I still have not received eight 
months of the salary from 1999‒2000. We used to call them “frozen salaries.” Not unlike the “frozen 
conflicts” that formed the strategic environment of our work. 
111 Personnel who officially are assigned to positions, but do not serve in reality. The commanders 
was getting their salaries and were able to have military IDs for privileges. The practice was common in 
post-Soviet countries.  
112Inherited from the Soviet system, the position-rank relationship was not standardized; positions 
only had the maximum rank assigned initially. So, a third lieutenant could be assigned to the position with 
a ceiling at colonel and could stay in the position of third lieutenant until he reached the rank of colonel. 
Promotions were based on an individual’s length of service and the supervisor’s/commander’s will. Such a 
system created situations in which a colonel was subordinate to a captain, or even a lieutenant.  
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III. DEFENSE INSTITUTION-BUILDING AND NATO 
INTEGRATION, SINCE 2004 
A. IMPORTANCE AND BACKGROUND OF NATO INTEGRATION 
This chapter analyzes defense institution-building after the Georgian government 
changed in 2004 and radical reforms started in all state institutions, including defense. 
Three main national security goals—provision of national security, integration into 
NATO, and contribution to international security—shaped the Georgian defense 
institution and ongoing reforms. Integration within the Alliance requires Georgia to 
develop its security and defense capabilities to achieve NATO compatibility. Therefore, 
NATO integration aspiration as it had in many Eastern and Western European countries 
facilitated reforms in Georgian defense.  
The mechanisms of cooperation such as the Integrated Partnership Action Plan, 
the Planning and Review Process, the Intensified Dialogue, the Annual National Plan, the 
NATO-Georgian Commission, as well as cooperation through PfP (Partnership for 
Peace) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) have been employed to 
promote the institution building, armed forces development, and NATO integration 
processes.   
Security sector reform and defense transformation in Georgia are supported by 
vast assistance from partner states, and Georgia is increasingly a contributor rather than a 
consumer of international security. Georgian peacekeepers have participated in multiple 
international operations, including Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Georgia is the largest 
non-NATO state contributor in ISAF, and Georgia is contributing more troops than most 
NATO Allies. Georgia is planning to participate in the post-ISAF mission in Afghanistan 
by training, educating, and assisting Afghan forces.113 
The challenges Georgia faces in pursuing NATO integration are political and 
institutional. The political challenges relate to Russia’s opposition to Georgia’s 
113Irakli Alasania, Minister of Defense of Georgia, “Georgia Reiterates Post-2014 Afghan 
Contribution,” Civil Georgia, February 22, 2013. http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=25779 
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aspirations, and also the existence of breakaway regions on Georgian territory. NATO 
state members have to date failed to reach an agreement on further advancement of 
Georgian integration mechanisms such as granting Membership Action Plan (MAP) 
status.114 
Despite the dynamic reforms in Georgian defense, numerous institutional 
challenges have been revealed and emphasize the need for further institution building that 
NATO compatibility requires. These needs include improvements in defense institutions 
and capabilities. This chapter focuses on how Georgian defense institutions have 
developed through NATO integration processes. It also analyzes institutional challenges 
for Georgian defense, such as political interference, institutional weakness, and 
organizational and manpower management deficiencies.  
1. Political Background of NATO Integration 
The disagreements among the NATO allies on the accession of Georgia to NATO 
and even on the steps to advance the integration process are seen as being politically 
motivated. NATO’s open door policy has been articulated in various statements, and the 
strong support from particular Allies creates hope for Georgia that its aspiration and 
continuous efforts to achieve NATO integration will result in positive outcomes. At the 
same time some Alliance observers note that NATO enlargement is not the mission and 
core function of the Alliance, and new members should be admitted if it is a “win-win 
situation” for both the new member and NATO. Some observers directly point to the two 
breakaway territories within Georgia, which are seen as impediments to Georgian 
integration according to paragraph 6 of the 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement, which 
requires that a country peacefully solve its territorial problems before entering NATO in 
order to ensure stability in the North Atlantic area. Some observers also argue that 
breakaway regions create a possibility that the “territorial disputes ... could lead to 
another war in the region.”115 In parallel, Russia still maintains its imperialistic attitude 
114Julianne Smith, “The NATO-Russia Relationship: Defining Moment or Déjà Vu?” CSIS, 2008, 
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/081110_smith_natorussia_web.pdf. 
115Smith, “The NATO-Russia Relationship.” 
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toward NATO enlargement and regarding Georgia’s choice of its security and political 
development. It is remarkable that some NATO members have expressed uncertainty 
about how Georgia’s leaders would behave if they had support from NATO in terms of 
using Article 5.116 
In this regard, it should be noted that the new government elected in 2012 has a 
much less harsh attitude toward Moscow and is trying to renew Georgia’s relationship 
with Russia. According to the current Defense Minister, Irakli Alasania, Georgia is “not 
going to end up entangled in a military confrontation.” Georgia is attempting to improve 
its relationship with Russia “step by step,” and trying to reintroduce itself to Abkhazians 
and South Ossetians as an attractive country in which all ethnic groups can peacefully 
live together.117 How the changes in the Georgian attitude toward Russian political 
pressure will affect the Georgian-Russian relationship and each NATO member state’s 
position will be shown at NATO’s next summit. However, these prospects vary in the 
judgment of different scholars and politicians.118 
2. Importance of NATO Integration 
Despite the delays in acquiring NATO membership or a MAP, the NATO 
integration process is advancing the security and defense developments in Georgia. The 
integration process is encouraging institution building, widening international 
cooperation, facilitating the cultivation of democratic values and standards, and 
introducing the country as a contributor to international security. According to the 
National Security Concept (NSC) 2011, Georgia, as a South East European country, has 
made its sovereign choice to go back to its “natural course of development”—that is, to 
be part of the West—and the NATO integration process is supporting the correction of 
“historic cataclysms.” Georgia had been kept apart from Europe. As an aspirant country, 
Georgia is committed to further adoption of Western democratic values and principles. 
116 David S.Yost, draft of Chapter 8, “NATO Enlargement in NATO’s Balancing Act (unpublished). 
117Joshua Kucera, “The Bug Pit Interview: Georgian Defense Minister Irakli Alasania,” August 1, 
2013, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/67335. 
118Nigel Chamberlain, “Momentum Gathering Behind Georgia’s Relentless Drive to Full NATO 
Membership,” NATO Watch, June 22, 2013. 
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NATO integration has been Georgia’s security and foreign policy priority since the 2003 
“Rose Revolution,” and officially Georgia sees it as the way to “strengthen Georgia’s 
security and ensure its stable development.”119 The changes in understanding and 
expectations are visible in NSC 2011, in comparison with NSC 2005, which stated that 
NATO membership is, as Weber, Sperling, and Smith described it, “the only means for 
guaranteeing the security of the state, for restoring its territorial integrity, and for 
protecting ‘Georgia’s land, air and maritime space.’”120 
Together with the enhancement of the country’s national security interests, NATO 
partnership provides a framework to broaden Georgia’s regional and international 
cooperation with NATO member states and other partners. Georgia welcomes and 
supports deepening NATO cooperation with the other two south Caucasian countries 
(Armenia and Azerbaijan). In terms of regional cooperation Georgia puts special 
emphasis on security cooperation with Turkey as a NATO member country and a 
regional leader.121 Finally, NATO integration also contributes to Georgia’s endeavors to 
achieve its primary mission—to protect the state’s sovereignty and ensure the national 
strategic mission’s accomplishment by developing its defensive capabilities and 
transforming its armed forces and defense institutions. 
B. PARTNERSHIP MECHANISMS 
Georgia has approached NATO with an interest in further cooperation. It joined 
the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1992 and the Partnership for Peace in 1994, 
signed a PfP Status of Force Agreement (SOFA) in 1995, and obtained an approved 
Individual Partnership Program (IPP) from NATO in 1995. The area of cooperation and 
partnership assistance has consequently increased. In the PfP and IPP frameworks, 
Georgia has been able to participate in various training and educational activities and 
hosted the following trainings: Medceur-2000, Cooperative Partner-2001, Cooperative 
119Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, 
http://www.mfa.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=453 
120Mark Webber, James Sperling, and Martin A. Smith, NATO`s Post-Cold War Trajectory Decline or 
Regeneration? (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 103.  
121Mikheil Saakashvili, Threat Assessment for 2010‒2013 (Tbilisi: National Security Council, 2010), 
20. 
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Best Effort-2002, Eternity-2002, Medceur/Rescuer-2003, Medceur/Rescuer-2005 
Eternity-2005, Cooperative Archer-2007, Cooperative Lancer/Cooperative Longbow-
2009122 and receive expertise and advice from NATO allies for further institution 
building and armed forces reforms. “PfP programs … finally became the real cornerstone 
of the army build-up.”123 Because Georgia’s military was inherited from the Soviet 
Union, the equipment and the infrastructure needed to be investigated, standardized, and 
further improved in order to achieve NATO compatibility. In parallel, personnel needed 
training and education, which would enable them to communicate and cooperate with 
partners. These aspects were the focus of the IPP.124 
By joining the Planning and Review Process (PARP) in 1999, Georgia took the 
responsibility to determine the policy objectives and reform plans, to agree on them with 
NATO, and to report on success. PARP was the first mechanism to plan, implement, and 
assess success in reforming the armed forces in line with the Partnership Goals (PG) to 
achieve NATO interoperability. The progress that Georgia made enabled the country to 
be represented and participate in the NATO-led peacekeeping mission in Kosovo 
(KFOR). Later on, Georgia succeeded in establishing host nation capabilities and hosted 
two PfP training exercises—Cooperative Partner 2001 and Cooperative Best Effort 
2002.125 
As cooperation was progressing, Georgia officially announced its aspiration to 
join NATO and its readiness to start an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) in 
2002, and it became the first country with an approved IPAP from NATO. Georgia 
highly praised the importance of IPAP, not as the mechanism of integration, but as the 
mechanism for supporting institution building and NATO compatibility. IPAP had four 
major areas for future reforms and asked the Georgian side to define target objectives, set 
timeframes, and share the progress for annual assessment. The four major areas of 
122 Partnership Mechanisms, Ministry of Defense,  http://www.mod.gov.ge/?pages=nato-
georgia&lang=ge. 
123Darchiashvili, “Georgian Security Sector Reform: Achievements and Failures,” 113. 
124Nika Chitadze, NATO North Atlantic Alliance as the Main Guarantee of Peace and Stability in the 
World. (Tbilisi, Georgia, 2008). 
125 NATO`s Relations with Georgia. NATO. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_38988.htm. 
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security reforms were: 1) political and security affairs; 2) defense, security and military 
affairs; 3) public information, scientific, environmental protection, and emergency 
management issues; and 4) administrative, information security, and resource affairs.126 
The turning point of intensification in the NATO-Georgia relationship and 
defense reform was the change of government in Georgia in 2003.127 NATO integration 
became the top priority, and therefore, IPAP actions were to guide the defense reforms. 
Beginning in 2004, in each fiscal year the Georgian MoD took the commitments 
according to IPAP, worked on the implementation of the reforms throughout the year, 
and reported on progress to a NATO assessment team at the end of the fiscal year. The 
reforms were supported by an increased defense budget, and consequently cooperation 
with NATO deepened, and Georgia received the Intensified Dialogue (ID). In 2007, the 
IPAP had to be revised due to the achievements that Georgia had made and the need to 
progress on further reform plans. Since 2008 Georgia has advanced to the preparation of 
an Annual National Plan (ANP) considering post-war (Russian-Georgian War in August 
2008) realities, and the need for reconstruction. For example, the new NSC added cyber 
security in the list of national interests,128 as Georgia had also experienced cyber attack 
during the war. In addition, the Threat Assessment document, developed in 2010, is 
highly influenced by the threats coming from Russia.129 
During the Russian-Georgian August War in 2008, NATO allies expressed deep 
concern, “calling for a peaceful and a lasting solution to the conflict based on respect for 
Georgia`s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity,”130 and NATO supported 
126Office of the State Minister on Euro-Atlantic Integration. http://eu-
nato.gov.ge/index.php?que=eng/G_A_N_E/Individual Partnership Action Plan/IPAP 
127Hiscock, “Impatient Reformers,” 119; Hamilton, Georgian Military Reform – An Alternative View; 
Jim Nichol, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests 
(Washington, DC: United States Foreign Press Center, 2006), 16; Wright, “Defense Reform and the 
Caucasus: Challenges of Institutional Reform during Unresolved Conflict,” 26. 
128 Saakashvili, National Security Concept of Georgia. (Tbilisi: National Security Council, 2011), 6. 
http://www.nsc.gov.ge/files/files/National%20Security%20Concept.pdf. 
129Saakashvili, Threat Assessment for 2010‒2013. (Tbilisi: National Security Council, 2010), 1‒2. 
http://www.nsc.gov.ge/files/files/legislations/policy/threatassessment2010_2013.pdf. 
130“Deepening Relations with Georgia.” NATO Backgrounder, 3. 
http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/Deepening_Relations_with_Georgia_EN.pdf 
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the country in assessing damage to the state infrastructure and the military establishment. 
NATO also contributed a total of EUR 2.87 million for demining and clearing the 
conflict territory of dangerous exploding munitions. The NATO-Georgia Commission 
(NGC) was established in 2008 by the signing of the framework document during the 
North Atlantic Council (NAC) visit in Tbilisi in September, 2008. In the framework of 
the NGC, the NATO-Georgia Professional Development Programme (PDP) was 
launched. The program supports the enhancement of civilian democratic control and 
capacity development in Georgia’s defense and wider security sector. The PDP provides 
opportunities for training, internships, experience sharing, and consultations in defense 
policy and planning, public relations, strategic leadership, human resource management, 
education, information analysis, crisis communication, building integrity, etc. The second 
phase started in 2009, and extended the program’s capacity to the wider security sector 
including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry of 
Justice, the National Military Academy, the National Security Council, and other 
institutions. The expansion over the wider security sector contributes also in interagency 
interaction and cooperation.131 
Georgia sees its participation in the ISAF and the post-ISAF activities as a 
mechanism of NATO integration,132 because the Alliance needs Georgian troops to meet 
NATO compatibility requirements, with an ability to conduct full-scale operations 
independently and with NATO allies, including U.S. forces. Currently Georgia has over 
1500 personnel deployed in Afghanistan in the district of Musa Qala in Helmand 
Province in southern Afghanistan, where “Georgian soldiers partner with Afghan 
National Security Forces to conduct patrols, clear roadside bombs and engage with 
locals.”133 By participating in international peacekeeping operations, Georgia 
demonstrates its will and capabilities to contribute to international peace and security and 
enhances its cooperation with NATO. At the same time participation in international 
131“NATO Fact Sheet,” NATO website, 
http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/topics_graphics/20111122_nato-georgia-pdp.pdf. 
132Alasania, Minister’s Vision 2013‒2014. 
133“Georgia: Now the Top Non-NATO Troop Contributor in Afghanistan,” NATO website (June 26, 
2013). 
 39 
                                                 
operations enhances the operational capabilities and professionalism of Georgian troops. 
General David Petraeus, a former commander of the ISAF mission, has said that he was 
“the only American General, who commanded Georgian soldiers in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.” General Petraeus told Saakashvili that he was amazed with the bravery of 
Georgian soldiers.”134 According to the Georgian President, Mikheil Saakashvili, ISAF 
“has not been in vain and resulted in moving U.S.-Georgia military cooperation to ‘a new 
level’ that would help Georgia to increase its self-defense capabilities.”135 
Georgia has taken note of the participation of the light infantry company in the 
Operational Capabilities Evaluation and Feedback Programme (OCC E&F).136 Georgia 
has been a member of this program since 2004. The program increases the partner state’s 
capabilities to participate in NATO-led operations and the NATO Response Forces. 
Georgia also shares its capabilities with NATO and PfP. In 2010, the Sachkhere 
Mountain Training School was granted the status of NATO/PfP Mountain Training and 
Education Centre, and since then it has hosted training for the military forces of NATO 
and PfP countries.137 
Partnership has been progressing. In 2010, based on the NAC’s decision to 
strengthen military-to-military cooperation, the Military Committee with Georgia Work 
Plan was launched. The Work Plan is focused on the development of the GAF, and 
elaborated concrete actions that the GAF need to conduct and the area of NATO support 
to meet ANP and PARP goals.138 
To support effective civilian control and defense institution-building in 2009 
NATO introduced a NATO Defense Enhancement Program (DEEP), which covers broad 
transformation processes. DEEP assistance is tailored to the individual nation`s 
134 “President Saakashvili met with General Petraeus in Washington,” February 3, 2012, Embassy of 
the United States in Georgia, http://georgia.usembassy.gov/latest-
news/press_releases2012/saakashvili_met_gen_petraeus.html. 
135 “Gen. Petraeus Praises Georgian Troops in Afghanistan,” Civil Georgia (Tbilisi), March 30, 2011, 
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=23290. 





                                                 
requirement to the development defense education institutions’ curricula and faculty.139 
Georgia also participates in the NATO Building Integrity (BI) project as an observer; 
however, deeper engagement is planned as the MoD sees BI as the tool for reinforcing 
transparency and accountability.140 
1. Reforms to Defense Institution-Building  
Georgia builds its defense institutions to accomplish the country’s national 
security mission and to achieve NATO compatibility by establishing democratic control 
and implementing continuous systematic reforms. The reforms and progress Georgia has 
made in the ten years from 2003 to 2013 is impressive and the difference between 
defense institutions now and then is enormous. At the same time, Georgia’s defense 
institutions, including the armed forces, were subject to harsh criticism regarding 
organizational management, personnel systems, resource management effectiveness, 
decision making, transparency, etc. History shows that institution building has required 
long and complicated processes and has been commonly challenged by internal 
institutional and external factors, and best practices teach that long-term processes of 
institutionalization are needed for institutions to form effectively.141 For Georgia, both 
aspects work hard. The main external factors are the security risks the country faces, and 
the internal factors vary from the country’s political and cultural features to its financial 
constraints. However, the country might have achieved greater progress without personal 
and political interference. This is why Georgia needs to establish firm institutions 
enhanced by an effective legislative system to limit, if not eliminate, the space available 
for such interference.  
NATO General Secretary Anders Fogh Rasmussen assessed Georgia as a model 
partner. “This country is, in so many ways, a model partner for NATO. You play a strong 
role in our operations, you are carrying through important reforms, and you are 
139James M. Keagle and Tiffany G. Petros, “Building Partner Capacity through Education: NATO 
Engagement with the Partnership for Peace,” The Quarterly Journal (Winter 2010), 48. 
140Ministry of Defense of Georgia, Partnership Mechanisms. 
141Hiscock, “Impatient Reformers,” 135. 
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committed to democracy and to membership of the Alliance,”142 Rasmussen addressed to 
an official Georgian audience in Tbilisi.  
The first practical steps toward Western defense institution-building started after 
the Rose Revolution in November 2003, when the government enhanced civilian control 
over the armed forces. This control was exercised by the first civilian defense minister 
and the MoD. In 2004, the NATO Euro Atlantic Partnership Council approved the launch 
of the Partnership Action Plan for Defense institution-building (PAP-DIB) for partner 
states in the South Caucasus and Central Asia, and also Moldova. This included Georgia 
by using existing partnership mechanisms such as IPAP and PARP. The ten PAP-DIB 
objectives covered all aspects of institution building including democratic control, 
civilian participation in defense and security policy, legislative and judicial oversight of 
the defense sector, national risks and requirement assessment, the defense management, 
compliance with international norms in defense and security field, personnel issues 
including training and career development, efficient defense spending, and international 
and regional cooperation.143 
In 2004, the minister of defense became a civilian and the ministry started to 
employ civilian personnel, civil servants. The civilian Defense Ministry became 
accountable to the Parliament and the National Security Council. Parliament as the 
supreme legislative organ approves defense related laws, determines foreign and 
domestic policy directions, and controls governmental activities. The role of Parliament 
is determined in the Constitution, and “Parliamentary responsibilities are also outlined, 
with a certain degree of generalization and with less emphasis on the functional 
arrangements for ensuring its effectiveness, in appropriately related legislation.”144 
142“NATO Praises Georgia and Encourages Further Reforms,” NATO website, June 22, 2013, 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_101669.htm. 
143“Partnership Action Plan on Defence Institution Building (PAP-DIB), June 7, 2004, NATO 
Official text e-library, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-893CA940-
43427163/natolive/official_texts_21014.htm. 
144Philipp Fluri and Hari Bucur-Marcu, Partnership Action Plan for Defence Institution Building: 
Country Profiles and Needs Assessments for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova. (Geneva: Geneva 
Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2007), 17. 
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Those observers who assessed the Georgian security and defense sector, at the 
initial phase of reforms, pointed out the lack of security concepts, strategy, and 
development direction as the fundamental problem. Therefore, by launching a Strategic 
Defense Review in 2004, the Ministry of Defense started the elaboration of a conceptual 
framework for security and defense to define security objectives, assess threats, and 
implement gradual, systematic reforms in the armed forces. According to the SDR plan, 
based on interagency cooperation, the first National Security Concept, National Military 
Strategy, Law on Defense Planning, and Annual Minister’s vision were developed. Once 
the conceptual framework had been developed, the most important stage of institution 
building—the implementation of the policy or the actual transformation process, started. 
SDR, for the first time in MoD history, introduced conceptualized assessment of the 
security environment, GAF goals and tasks, a capability based approach, and long-term 
development plans. It introduced prognosis of budget and force structure up to 2016.145 
Since 2005, NATO has approved Georgian MoD requests to have assistance in 
organizational management and the Financial Management and Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting systems (PPBS) development. The project team led by the Dutch government, 
with NATO support, helped Georgians to develop the PPBS Concept and Manual, which 
considered establishing effective and efficient resource management, long-term planning, 
program-based budgeting, and decentralized decision making in each of nine programs. 
The PPBS project and the establishment of the Management Team and Decision Making 
Board within its framework were the first attempts at linking defense planning to the 
National Military Strategy and the Threat Assessment, to develop medium- and long-term 
plans (which required close cooperation with the Ministry of Finance and its 
transformation on long-term planning), to distribute decision-making power horizontally 
in contrast to the existing vertical model.146 
145David Kezerashvili, Minister of Defense of Georgia. Strategic Defense Review. Ministry of 
Defense of Georgia, 2007 (Georgian version) 
http://www.mod.gov.ge/assets/uploads/files/yzqhgsgsregeo.pdf. 
146 “Reform of Georgia’s Defence Sector,” Transparency International, 2. 
http://transparency.ge/en/node/220. 
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The last SDR approved in 2013 develops careful approaches and sets sovereignty 
and territorial unity as key missions of Georgian defense forces. New leadership puts 
emphasis on wiser and more transparent budget allocations to ensure the development of 
needed capabilities enabling Georgia to fulfill its missions in country and in international 
peacekeeping operations. Contribution to international security remains as one of the top 
priorities, and sets the requirements of increased interoperability with NATO forces.147 
Minister’s Vision 2013 considers further improvement of command and control, 
doctrine, training, mobility, air defense surveillance, logistics, military intelligence, 
infrastructure, and reserve systems. Together these are institutional reforms, human 
resource development, NATO compatibility, international cooperation, and transparency 
and civilian control.148 Both the revised SDR and Minister’s Vision address weaknesses 
revealed in recent years and reflect critical approaches. 
C. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT 
Personnel management and its sensible reform, as the key for institutional success 
and broadly acknowledged as one of the weakest points of Georgian defense, has always 
been the focus of the reforms. Therefore, it appeared at the top of the agenda for 
assistance from partner states and for the NATO assessment teams. The U.S. has assigned 
a special advisor on personnel issues; human resource management was added as the 
component of previously mentioned Dutch PPBS/FMS project; the UK has included 
personnel management in its assistance package; Germany has assigned a special 
representative for NCO issues; and Turkey has begun sharing its experience on personnel 
management.  
The defense policy priorities for 2005‒2006 submitted to the Parliament, stated 
that main defense policy priority—improving the GAF capabilities was requiring the 
training of the qualified personnel and improving their working and living conditions. 
The report also declared that development of personnel management policy had already 
147“Strategic Defence Review, 2013.” Ministry of Defence of Georgia, 2013. 
http://www.mod.gov.ge/?pages=mimoxilvis-dokumenti. 
148Alasania, “Minister’s Vision.”  
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started and was focused on the career management system. The very first step, which was 
also supported by the SDR, was to determine the exact number of personnel who actually 
serve in the armed forces and create an adequate database, to create a unified civilian and 
military personnel data system, and to issue digital identification cards which would 
support registration and maintain statistics on the existing personnel.149 
To exercise civilian oversight for armed forces personnel management by 
developing policy and monitoring its implementation, in 2006 the Human Resource 
Management Policy Section was established as the part of Defense Policy Division. The 
section was broadened as a division and then later as a department in 2007. The 
department is responsible for developing policy for human resources, including military 
and civilian personnel, and executing the management of civilian personnel.150 
While policy was being developed, the personnel management system started to 
progress noticeably. “Visible developments” occurred in developing personnel 
management concepts, job descriptions, performance evaluation, military occupational 
specialty, professional development, career management, and increasing social 
provisions.151 From the previously mentioned assistance, the personnel management 
system was becoming more consistent with NATO requirements.152 
The reform started setting up an electronic personnel database and established a 
performance appraisal system. The new system of evaluation considered the annual 
formal evaluation from two supervisors and acceptance/non-acceptance from the 
evaluated person. Training and written exams have been held to support the field 
commanders in conducting fair and effective evaluations and promotions. Newly created 
Selection Boards discussed and reached a consensus based on independent decisions on 
149Ministry of Defense of Georgia, “Defense Policy Priorities for 2005‒2006 (Main Directions of the 
Ministry of Defense),” Parliament of Georgia, 1, 
http://www.parliament.ge/files/292_880_864945_modeng.pdf. 
150“The Regulation of Human Resources Management Department,” Ministry of Defense of Georgia, 
2007, https://matsne.gov.ge/index.php?option 
=com_ldmssearch&view=docView&id=1878494 
151Fluri and Bucur-Marcu, “Partnership Action Plan for Defence Institution Building,” 24 
152 Reform of Georgia’s Defence Sector,” Transparency International. 
 45 
                                                 
promotions and selection of personnel for educational opportunities abroad. According to 
the Transparency International report on Georgia, “the new system of evaluation and 
promotion is designed to reward education, experience, and ability while keeping 
nepotism in check.”153 
To disrupt the practice of corruption and nepotism, the MoD has dismissed 
approximately two-thirds of senior personnel, including 35 Soviet-experienced generals. 
To refill the vacancies, as Hedvig Lohm quotes Vice Minister Sikharulidze, the 
institution was looking for “young talented people to learn by doing.”154 To manage 
reorganization and redundancies, the Ministry of Defense cooperated with international 
organizations. In 2007, the International Organization of Migration launched the project 
to support dismissed military personnel in the separation and civilian reintegration 
processes. The project considered small grants, business consultations, and job 
counseling assistance for the military personnel who were redundant in the frames of 
personnel reforms and reorganization processes.155 
In addition, a special focus was placed on training and education and the reform 
of the National Defense Academy (NDA). The reforms, which are going with “high 
intensity,” consider development of the faculty and establish new curricula such as 
Advanced Defense Studies granting a Master’s degree.156 Together with bilateral 
assistance, Georgia benefits from the NATO Defense Enhancement Program (DEEP) 
which currently is tailored to develop NDA capabilities. The renovated NDA offers a 
number of educational courses to Georgian military branches and a Bachelor’s degree 
education to cadets. The process of developing the course curricula for all GAF branches 
is ongoing. English language is taught in each brigade. In parallel, the German-supported 
153 Ibid. 
154 Hedvig Lohm, “It’s Not all Roses: Georgian Defense Reforms sine the Rose Revolution,” (2006), 
32, http://www.lunduniversity.lu.se/o.o.i.s?id=24965&postid=1323368 
155International Organization of Migration, “Giving New Chances to Excess Military Personnel,” 
(2007), http://www.iom.ge/index_iom.php?newslater4&home. 
156Tengiz Pkhaladze and Alexander Rondeli, “Georgia,” in Security Sector Reform in Countries of 
Visegrad and Southern Caucasus: Challenges and Opportunities, ed. Security Sector Reform in Countries 
of Visegrad and Southern Caucasus: Challenges and Opportunities (Bratislava, Slovakia: Centre for 
European and North Atlantic Affairs (CENAA, 2013), 12. 
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NCO school serves to train NCOs, and Sachhkere PfP Mountain School hosts students 
from PfP countries to be trained together with Georgian mountain troops.157 
Evidently, personnel management became a part of the success story of Georgian 
defense reform; however, MoD needs to continue further efforts for reform. 
Establishment of the institutional mechanisms for personnel management, such as 
policies for assignments, promotions, and career management limited the space for 
nepotism and personally affiliated decisions. Also expanding the educational 
opportunities in the country and abroad provided more skilled staff members who are 
dedicated to change. Even so, personnel management reform as a whole transformation 
process has had delays and unsystematic changes of direction, which has constrained the 
complete success of the defense reforms. 
  
157Chitadze, “NATO North Atlantic Alliance as the Main Guarantee of Peace and Stability in the 
World.” 
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IV. THE CHALLENGES OF DEFENSE INSTITUTION-BUILDING 
AMONG NEW NATO MEMBERS, 1989 ONWARD 
Since the end of the Cold War, Eastern and Central European countries have gone 
through similar patterns of transformation and faced similar institutional challenges 
shaped by the Communist legacy and its military heritage. Some of these countries, like 
Hungary, Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania, have inherited established military structures 
and personnel and have needed to reshape these institutions and downsize their armed 
forces due to the changed political realities that occurred after the Cold War. The others, 
mostly former Yugoslavian, the Baltic states, and Slovakia, like Georgia, had to start 
from scratch or from the remnants of the predecessor state, usually in a jumble. Although, 
defense institutions in both cases suffered from a lack of understanding and experience 
exercising democratic civilian control; a deficiency of interoperable civilian and military 
expertise; the absence of security and defense policy, concepts and strategies; limited 
finances; and weak pluralistic institutional mechanisms. In some cases, ineffective and 
undemocratic civilian control in the new democracies of the Central and Eastern 
European countries led civilian authorities to use the armed forces as a tool for political 
power and influence, especially at the beginning stages in the early 1990s. In addition, 
transition to the market economy, emerging economic difficulties, and a lack of financial 
expertise negatively affected the budgetary processes, created financial irregularities, and 
encouraged massive corruption.  
Poor civilian control and financial difficulties were undermining not only defense 
institutions but the armed forces as well. Chris Donnelly, who served as Special Adviser 
for Central and Eastern European Affairs to the Secretary General of NATO in 
1989‒2003, generalizes the situation in Eastern and Central European countries armed 
forces as “the uncontrollable sale or distribution of military materiel, lack of guidelines of 
officers using their positions and forces under their command for personal purposes, 
hiring out of soldiers by the officers, straightforward theft, and other corrupt practices—
all highly destructive of military discipline—proliferated.”158 Exacerbating the discipline 
158Chris Donnelly, “Reform Realities,” 37–38. 
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problem in the armed forces and increased corruption were making civilian control even 
more difficult and ineffective. However, as these countries have decided their orientation 
toward the West and their aspiration for NATO integration, they have initiated the 
necessary reforms in both civilian and military directions.  
A. ROLE OF NATO PARTNERSHIP AND ACCESSION  
NATO partnership and integration facilitated the reforms and defense institutions 
in most Central and East European countries. It has introduced the standards and tools for 
improvements, such as North Atlantic Cooperation Council (1991) and the Partnership 
for Peace (1994) and a number of individual partnership programs in growing detail and 
complexity. NATO partnership and accession criteria were endorsing the democratic 
civilian control, transparency of defense planning and budgeting, and operational and 
capability improvement of armed forces as compatible for cooperation with NATO 
members in international missions.159 In practice, NATO membership has appeared to be 
an effective political tool forcing national governments to establish democratic civilian 
control and implement reforms.160 It has led countries, for example Slovenia,161 to 
increase defense expenditures, develop expeditionary forces for international missions, 
implement better personnel policies, and improve procurements and acquisitions. 
Scholars see positive and negative outcomes from using the NATO factor to inspire 
national governments, senior officers, or defense civilians to make changes and reforms 
in the shadow of the chaos in south Eastern Europe. The positive outcome is that the 
NATO factor definitely was “pushing” the reforms in Eastern Europe. Negative outcomes 
are mostly related to the inadequate spending and civil-military tensions amid. According 
to Donnelly, senior commanders often used NATO to justify the procurement of 
expensive and sometimes unnecessary equipment. The second negative outcome of using 
159Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council/North Atlantic Cooperation Council, 
“Partnership for Peace: Framework Document” (NATO Headquarters, Brussels, January 10‒11, 1994). 
160Florina Cristiana Matei, “The Impact of NATO Membership: Hungary,” in The Routledge 
Handbook of Civil-Military Relations, eds. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei (New York: 
Routledge, 2013b), 229. 
161Florina Cristiana Matei, “Civilian Influence in Defense: Slovenia,” in The Routledge Handbook of 
Civil-Military Relations, eds. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei (New York: Routledge, 
2013a), 160‒161. 
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“NATO demands” as the excuse for pushing defense reforms was that “they [defense 
civilians] lacked the self-confidence to tackle this issue on their authority”162 and such an 
attitude negatively affected civil-military relationships and public confidence.  
By contrast, the political scientist Rachel Epstein offers different perspectives on 
why NATO has exercised more influence on civilian rather than military officers. She has 
developed the hypothesis on the circumstances which support international institutions to 
acquire and generate support from domestic actors to pursue the reforms. The hypothesis 
is that the change of regimes and discharge of old institutions/interest groups “leave 
domestic actors uncertain about how to make a policy.”163 Such uncertainty was low in 
the military personnel in Poland, Romania, Hungary, and therefore, they resisted NATO 
influence. At the same time, civilians had a higher level of uncertainty, as these countries 
did not have democratic civilian defense institutions. As a result the civilians were more 
open to NATO advice, while militaries had highly self-confident visions of the reforms 
process.164 
Nevertheless, as most scholars emphasize, NATO integration played a 
tremendous role in defense institution-building in Eastern European countries. Even so, 
establishment and development of democratic civilian control and defense institutions 
have faced numerous challenges, such as communist institutional legacy, political 
instability, and limited resources and capabilities.    
B. DEMOCRATIC CIVILIAN CONTROL 
Defense institution-building and the establishment of democratic civilian control 
progressed slowly after 1989 and  the process has been challenging.165 The reforms 
started by developing the national laws in the defense sector, which established the 
162Donnelly, “Reform Realities,” 40. 
163Rachel A. Epstein, In Pursuit of Liberalism International Institutions in Post-communist Europe 
(Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins University Press, 2008), 14. 
164Ibid., 110. 
165Matei, “Civilian Influence in Defense: Slovenia,” 161; Florina Cristiana Matei, “NATO, the 
Demand for Democratic Control, and Military Effectiveness Romania,” in The Routledge Handbook of 
Civil-Military Relations, eds. Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei (New York: Routledge, 
2012), 221. 
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mechanisms of democratic control over the armed forces, and defined the missions, roles, 
and responsibilities of military and defense civilian structures. The civil-military has been 
‘problematique’166 in the post-Communist era, as Epstein analyzes in the cases of 
Romania, Hungary, and Poland. It has differed from the most common practice of 
controlling the military, and was challenged by political interference in military affairs. 
The most common problem after establishing civilian control was that it appeared far 
from being democratic control as NATO sees it.167 The issue of political interference and 
the efforts of political parties to exert their own influence on the military, especially the 
officer corps, challenged the democratic control in Bulgaria as well.168 Hard challenges 
took place in Romania, where defense institution-building was accompanied by “hasty, 
erratic and inadequate de-politicization processes,”169 according to Florina Matei. The 
progress in institution building in all countries has been slowed also due to the lack of 
understanding and education of the defense field in civil society. Soviet legacy has 
hindered people from requiring accountability. Even the NGOs, which have fewer 
opportunities for and traditions of defense education in post-Communist countries (for 
example, Hungary), lacked the competencies to demand and exercise adequate external 
civilian oversight on defense issues.170 
Subjective civilian control, a term coined by Samuel Huntington, describes the 
situation in which the lack of defense field expertise on the part of civilians impedes 
democratic control, as was also broadly evidenced in Eastern European states’ new 
defense institutions. One of the main reasons for defense incompetence in these countries 
comes from the lack of tradition and absence of educational opportunities as the common 
Soviet and Socialist legacy. Donnelly emphasizes the lack of general and national 
defense knowledge from civilian authority as one of the major problems for defense 
166Peter D. Feaver, “Civil-Military Relations 1,” Annual Review of Political Science 2, no. 1 (1999), 
211‒241, 214. 
167Epstein, In Pursuit of Liberalism International Institutions in Post-communist Europe, 108. 
168TodorTagarev, Phases and Challenges of Security Sector Reform in the Experience of Bulgaria, 
vol. 85 (Sofia, Bulgaria: Institute of Information and Communication Technologies, Centre for Security 
and Defence Management, 2011), 108. 
169Matei, “NATO, the Demand for Democratic Control, and Military Effectiveness Romania,” 327. 
170Matei, “The Impact of NATO Membership:Hungary,” 223. 
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reforms and institution building in Central and Eastern Europe. According to him, “no 
one in the government really knows how many hospital beds are the equivalent of the 
cost of a battalion of tanks, or if the civilian government cannot identify how many tanks 
are required to defend the country.”171 Even after NATO accession, defense institutions 
and democratic civil-military relations were challenged by a lack of understanding of 
military affairs, weak cooperation between General Staff and MoD, corruption, bribery, 
and favoritism.172 
In parallel, appointments in the ministries of defense were driven more by 
political motives than the finding and using of rare professionals in the defense sector. 
Such appointments sometimes included an appointment of a minister to grant a reward to 
a particular person for his political support or as part of a political deal. Matei points out 
the negative outcomes of such political interference on civilian control, military 
effectiveness, and resource allocations in Hungary.173 Lack of expertise among defense 
civilians challenging defense institution-building was also demonstrated in Slovenia, 
where lack of expertise caused “erratic or ineffective” reforms and policies, political 
scandal, corruption, and blackmail.174 She gives examples of such as continuing the 
“exceptional” promotions in higher rank officers. The reality of political immaturity in 
military issues aggravated civilian oversight mechanisms and saved room for personal 
decisions and interference. For example, the command system in Bulgaria, which 
considers the President as the Supreme Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces while 
the defense minister is approved by the Parliament, created a civil-military friction. As 
Todor Tagarev assesses, due to the personal conflict between the President and Defense 
Minister of Bulgaria, the military intelligence department was operating without the 
officially appointed head.175 Another example of political interference in military issues 
is discussed by Matei. In Hungary, the decision on foreign military deployment fell under 
171Chris Donnelly, “Defence Transformation in the New Democracies: A Framework for Tackling the 
Problem,” NATO Review 45 (1997), 15‒19. 
172Matei, “NATO, the Demand for Democratic Control, and Military Effectiveness Romania,” 327. 
173Matei, “The Impact of NATO Membership: Hungary,” 223. 
174Matei, “Civilian Influence in Defense: Slovenia,” 164. 
175Tagarev, “Phases and Challenges of Security Sector Reform in the Experience of Bulgaria,” 4‒5. 
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the authority of Parliament. First, this situation has caused the politicization of a military 
issue, and second, it causes procedural complications if, for example, the unit needed to 
deploy when the Parliament was on vacation.176 
C. INSTITUTIONAL-ORGANIZATIONAL CHALLENGES 
The common institutional-organizational challenges that newly established or 
reshaped defense institutions faced due to the lack of defense expertise were the civilian-
military tensions natural to domestic and international politics; unclear roles and 
missions; lack of vision and strategy; inadequate planning; ineffective organizational 
arrangements, decision making, and resources, including human resources, allocation, 
and management.  
Western and Central European armed forces have commonly faced the inheritance 
of a large-size Soviet style military, trying to maintain its old, “massive” force structures 
and infrastructures, which were made to contrast by the smaller, all volunteer and 
expeditionary forces that came into vogue in the U.S./NATO in the wake of the 1990–1 
Gulf War and 11 September terrorism episode. However, due to rapid social and 
economic changes, the transition to the market economy, and shrinking resources, old 
force structures quickly appeared inadequate to all concerned. Accordingly, even 
downsized armed forces have commonly remained top-heavy organizations, which have 
hindered the reform process. In addition, the dismissal of senior officers without 
appreciation, further financial and social security, or assistance in civilian reintegration 
appeared as a widespread practice in the post-Socialist military. Accordingly, these 
officers were trying to use all their power to stay in their positions which highly 
demoralized younger officers and frustrated the whole generation who previously were 
considering becoming career officers.177 
Attempts to maintain “an old system” were not the only issue related to massive 
top structure. Once the downsizing problem was more or less solved, it appeared that the 
reform of the decision-making processes, flow of documentation, and intra-organizational 
176Matei, “The Impact of NATO Membership: Hungary,” 222. 
177Donnelly, “Reform Realities,” 39. 
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relations between units met even more challenges than previous downsizing or structural 
reorganization. Most resources had been spent on either “keeping the old system on life 
support” or implementing only a cosmetic reform instead of a systematic and substantive 
one.178 
The reforms, as scholars conclude, driven by NATO membership, appeared to be 
façade changes and they became more vulnerable after some countries’ accession to 
NATO. In the case of Romania, where as in most other cases NATO membership 
aspiration forced the reforms toward defense democratization and effectiveness, the 
continuation of reforms and further institution building started suffering after 
membership was granted as a result of “the lack of carrots and sticks.” The political elite 
including legislative bodies lost interest and objected to further budget allocation for 
defense reforms and modernization or acquisition of equipment and capabilities. Matei 
emphasizes the political will as “cardinal” in effectiveness and continuance of defense 
institution-building and armed forces reforms. This political will was lacking in regard to 
democratization of civil-military relations and also to military effectiveness.179 
Institutionalization of democratic control was the biggest challenge faced by the 
Czech Republic’s defense institutions, as well. The fact that the Czech Republic gained 
independence through a “velvet divorce” from Czechoslovakia in 1992, political and 
societal circles were integrated in aspiration to share Western values, and NATO 
demonstrated eagerness and efforts to grant accession. Communist legacy, however, 
played a role. Newly established civilian control lacked the democratic nature, the 
defense budget was not fully transparent, and newly adopted legislative norms or policies 
lacked ownership by national actors. In short, as Gheciu concludes, Czech polity, 
including defense civilians, needed to change their thinking and “completely transcend 
old habits and Communist attitudes.”180 
178Ibid., 40. 
179Matei, “NATO, the Demand for Democratic Control, and Military Effectiveness Romania,” 328. 
180Gheciu, NATO in the “New Europe,” 357, 108. 
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Another common challenge rooted in these attitudes shared by Eastern European 
countries was a lack of understanding and facts to develop visions, concepts, and policies 
and to plan adequately. Furthermore, they were saddled with ambiguous command 
systems. Poland demonstrates this case, as the former Polish deputy defense minister and 
scholar Andrzej Karkoszka concludes. At its entry to NATO, Karkoszka explains, Polish 
Armed Forces “were visibly lacking a compatible level of command at the operational 
level” in western practice.181 Also, Hungarian defense institutions suffered from the 
ambiguity in roles and missions, as well as the absence of concepts, which together 
hindered the effective institution building and promoted the rivalry and tensions between 
civilian and military settings. Unclear missions caused parallelism, duplications, and 
overlapping functions. The rivalry between civilian and military structures disrupted the 
efforts of cooperation and information sharing.182 As a result, the reforms were slow and 
less effective.  
Donnelly generalizes about one more of the institutional challenges in regard to 
defense reforms in Central and Western European countries as the people in these 
institutions who lacked a deep understanding and ownership of defense reforms. As to 
their lacking the understanding of Western models and practices, they either totally 
neglected the changes or applied some particular NATO country’s model to their defense 
systems without analyzing these practices and adapting them to the local environment, 
culture, or available resources. In some cases the advice they were getting appeared to be 
irrelevant, unreliable, and biased. Another vulnerable point to defense institution-building 
was the lack of ownership of the reform process. Change agents or advocates of reforms 
in some cases failed or achieved only temporary success because of this lack of 
ownership and active involvement from existing mid-level structures or because of 
discouragement from senior leadership “who viewed them as a threat.”183 
181Andrzej Karkoszka, “Defense Reform in Poland, 1989‒2000,” in Post-Cold War Defense Reform 
Lessons Learned in Europe and the United States, eds. Istvan Gyarmati and Theodor Winkler (Washington, 
DC: Brassey’s Inc., 2002). 
182Matei, “The Impact of NATO Membership: Hungary,” 222. 
183 Ibid., 222. 
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One more common pattern revealed by Donnelly is the mismanagement of the 
training and education acquired in Western countries which were intended to contribute 
to the reforms process. Young officers, who received education abroad, instead of getting 
promoted or being involved as leaders of the reforms, were discouraged, demoted, 
ignored, or even dismissed.184 
As a conclusion, it can be argued that defense institution-building in Eastern and 
Central Europe was strongly facilitated by NATO membership aspirations. However, the 
Communist past and an entrenched bureaucracy together with the immaturity of the new 
democracies challenged defense institution building. Newly established civilian control 
lacked democracy and accountability as a result of defense expertise deficiency and 
attempts of political influence. Institutional challenges rooted in the Communist past 
were political interference; ambiguous roles and mission; an absence of policy, concepts, 
and adequate planning; the lack of will and ownership of reforms; lack of expertise in 
defense issues, and mismanagement of resources, including human resources. The 
foregoing bears on the case of Georgia, in its own struggle to affect reform of its security 
sector and especially its defense personnel in the past twenty years of political change in 
Europe. 
  
184Donnelly, “Reform Realities,” 41. 
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V. INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES OF GEORGIAN DEFENSE 
Georgian defense institution-building has been turbulent for a variety of 
compelling reasons examined below in the realms of international politics, domestic 
politics and the dynamics of reform in armies and society. While at the stage of 
establishment of defense institutions, most attempts were to organize and control armed 
forces, at the second stage institutional deficiencies became apparent. At this stage, it was 
a struggle to establish defense institutions in the almost failing state. There were 
permanent financial shortages, widespread bribery and corruption, legislative 
insufficiencies, policy and strategy deficiency, and power centralization and absence of 
defense expertise impeded the institution-building. The second stage started after the 
2003 Rose Revolution and the change of government. Step by step all basic financial 
needs started to be met, strategic direction toward NATO integration became well set, 
concepts developed, and personnel experienced improvements in working and living 
conditions, as well as opportunities for education and professional development.  
Overall, Georgia has achieved the transformation from being a consumer to 
becoming a contributor in international peace. The country’s new leaders have had to 
implement tough methods to fight against a Soviet legacy focused on corruption. 
However, the attitudes—especially regarding political involvement and personally biased 
decisions—appeared to be the most difficult to overcome. Moreover, legislative authority 
lacked the necessary oversight mechanisms. Also, the reforms and elimination of 
institutional deficiencies were impeded by continuous transition and frequent changes in 
political leadership and priorities. These changes made it difficult to develop and 
maintain still very scarce defense expertise.  
This chapter analyzes the institutional challenges Georgian defense faced during 
its transformation, and it also discusses the problematic areas of the early stages as a 
background. The first part of the chapter discusses the deficiencies Georgian defense 
institutions suffered, such as permanent financial shortages, widespread bribery and 
corruption, legislative insufficiencies, policy and strategy deficiency, power 
centralization, and absence of defense expertise. After background discussion, the chapter 
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concentrates on the following areas of institutional challenges of Georgian defense: weak 
civilian oversight, political interference, and lack of defense expertise. 
A. CHALLENGES AT EARLY STAGES 
1. Legislative Insufficiency 
Georgian legislation has some ambiguity regarding civil-military relations. The 
Constitution, as the basic document defining the civil-military relationship and defense 
institutions, authorizes the Parliament to define the main direction of internal and external 
policy and the President to lead and implement the policy.185 Darchiashvili also 
emphasizes the ambiguity regarding the command authority. The President, who is the 
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, defines its structure and appoints the Chief of 
Defense, while the number of the Armed Forces needs to be approved by the Parliament 
and the Defense Minister is appointed by the Prime Minister. According to Darchiashvili, 
“this ambiguity allowed personality, charisma, and personal influence to prevail over 
institutional framework,”186 and even more, it may create a stalemate between President 
and Parliament if they fail to achieve consensus.187 Indeed, vagueness and unclear 
distribution of authority and responsibilities among the President as the Supreme 
Commander of Armed Force, Defense Minister, and Head of General Staff have 
challenged civil-military relations.188 
Similarly the Law on Defense, approved in 1997, which was intended to define 
the “basics and organization of Georgian Defense,” was criticized as also lacking clarity. 
Despite a similar amendment added in 2002, it remained vague and failed to achieve 
separation of authority and distribution of functions between the Ministry of Defense and 
185 The Constitution of Georgia, 1995. Article 48 and Article 69. The text with the amendments up to 
2006, http://www.parliament.ge/files/68_1944_951190_CONSTIT_27_12.06.pdf 
186 Darchiashvili, “Georgian Defense Policy and Military Reform,” 134. 
187 This ambiguity existing from the approval of the constitution in 1995 still creates challenges. The 
2012 Parliamentary election was won by the opposition party; therefore, the prime minister became the 
leader of the opposition party. The president used his authority and did not appoint the CHOD who was 
supported by the defense minister.  
188 International Security Advisory Board, ISAB Report 2004, 
http://fes.ge/de/images/Fes_Files/05Publications/isab_full_new.pdf. 
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General Staff. It also could not provide the civilian oversight mechanism. The minister 
was still military and there was only one civilian deputy minister with few staff.189 
In parallel, Georgian legislation lacked the provisions to ensure transparency and 
democratic accountability. Before 2004, corruption was widespread at all levels of 
institutional arrangements, especially in the budgetary processes and procurements. 
Despite attempts at controlling defense budget and expenditures from the civilian side, 
such as establishing the Trust Group or Anticorruption Policy Coordination Council, they 
either were not granted full access to information or their reports were not adequately 
addressed by the President or Parliament.190 In general, civilian control over defense 
spending was missing.191 
2. Scarceness of Resources and Abundance of Corruption 
As the country was in transition and in deep economic crisis, the Georgian 
defense sector lacked financial resources. Therefore, logistics and infrastructural 
demands were not met. Personnel suffered poor living or working conditions, shortage of 
uniforms and equipment, and very low and sometimes undelivered salaries followed to 
budget sequesters. Such situations hindered any attempts at reform or development of 
institutional capacity.  
Constrained finances and poor working and living conditions encouraged 
widespread corruption. In addition, the Soviet legacy of bureaucracy and the Georgian 
“traditional clannish relationship” played their role to make corruption a systemic 
problem for all state institutions including defense. Antje Fritz demonstrates a pyramid 
shaped corruption scheme, starting with the President and his family at the top and 
spreading widely downward through less influential societal elements to deep roots. The 
amount of money to be made from corruption depended on the hierarchy of the 
189Tamara Pataraia, “Defence Institution Building in Georgia,” in Defence Institution Building: 
Country Profiles and Needs Assessments for Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova, eds. Philipp Fluri 
and Viorel Cibotaru (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2008), 50. 
190David Darchiashvili, “Georgian Defense Policy and Military Reform,” in Statehood and Security: 
Georgia After the Rose Revolution, eds. Bruno Coppieters and Robert LegvoldAmerican Academy Studies 
in Global Security. Cambridge and London: MIT Press, 2005), 117–154., 135. 
191 Pataraia, “Defence Institution Building in Georgia,” 50.  
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“pyramid.”192 Also, all incentives, career or financial, very much depended on personal 
loyalty to the President and his network.193 
3. Soviet Inherited Administration 
After small improvements in funding and meeting basic needs, institutional 
challenges such as the absence of concepts and relevant planning became more obvious. 
Without a strategy, scarce financial resources faced the threat of being mismanaged, and 
the reforms development missed vigilant short- and medium-term planning.194 While the 
absence of conceptual documents was an obvious challenge, there were no guarantees 
that development of policy would have made a dramatic change. Despite the existence of 
the laws, officials based decisions on extensions of clannish or personal influence and 
could be reluctant to follow or would ignore the laws. Antje Fritz emphasizes the 
common Soviet legacy as the ground of the real challenge, which was implementation 
and enforcement the laws.195 
Power centralization based on political loyalty coming from the President was 
widespread throughout the whole institution and exercised based on the previously 
mentioned loyalty network. Decisions regarding organization or resource management 
were based on personal relationships rather than missions or tasks, and they completely 
ignored democratic procedures.196 
4. Lack of Skills and Professionalism  
Parallel to previous discussion, institution building was harshly impeded by 
absence of personnel development possibilities and tools, frequent and ungrounded 
192 Antje Fritz, “Security Sector Governance in Georgia (I): Status,” in From Revolution to Reform: 
Georgia`s Struggle with Democratic Institution Building and Security Sector Reform, eds. Philipp H. Fluri 
and Eden Cole (Vienna, Austria: National Defence Academy and Bureau for Security Policy, in co-
operation with the PfP Consortium of Defence Academies and Security Studies Institutes: Study Group 
Information, 2005), 54. 
193 Darchiashvili, Georgian Defense Policy and Military Reform (2005): 117–154, 135. 
194 Sir Garry Johnson. International Security Advisory Board Report: Georgian Foundation of 
Security and International Studies, 2006. 
195 Fritz, Security Sector Governance in Georgia (I): Status, 54. 
196Ibid., 53. 
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movement, and absence of “efficient, dedicated and politically neutral civil service.”197 
The same challenges applied to the military personnel, who also mirrored all the 
institutional deficiencies. While promotion was based on nepotism and there were few 
opportunities for training and education, together with an underpaid job, the majority of 
officers were unmotivated and uninspired to make any sound reforms.198 
These were the legacy the new government inherited from post-Soviet, almost 
failing state, and the reforms started. Economic development, which would provide 
resources for defense transformation, would promote democracy and that would enhance 
civilian oversight and fight against widespread corruption. These became vital national 
goals.  
B. INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES DURING THE REFORMS 
The post-Rose Revolution government has made tremendous changes—more than 
in many other countries—and these changes were especially obvious in the defense and 
military field.199 The shift from being “a collection of loosely organized, poorly 
disciplined units with famously corrupt leadership”200 to the defense institution managing 
the Georgian Armed Force’s contribution in international security has happened. The 
reforms have included a broad range of success stories at the “policy and conceptual …. 
[and] structural and institutional levels”201 according to Greg Simons. He also assesses 
defense reforms as parallel processes and emphasizes “personnel, structural, equipment, 
doctrinal and psychological changes.”202 However, despite the noticeable transformation 
Georgian defense has a long way to go to institutionalize and further develop these 
reforms. Careful analysis of the ongoing reforms reveals the institutional challenges, 
197Sir Garry Johnson. International Security Advisory Board Report, 6. 
198Pataraia, Defence Institution Building in Georgia, 50. 
199 Hiscock, “Impatient Reformers,” 119. 
200 Hamilton, Georgian Military Reform–An Alternative View, Commentary, Center for Strategic & 
International Studies, February, 3, 2009, https://csis.org/publication/georgian-military-reform  
201Greg Simons, “Security Sector Reform and Georgia: The European Union’s Challenge in the 




                                                 
which are mainly concentrated in three areas in this paper. First, strengthened civilian 
control lacked democratization, parliamentary oversight, and public accountability. 
Second, political interference, aimed at achieving either international or domestic 
political dividends or grounded on personal perceptions, corrupted strategic decisions and 
concept implementation. Third, reforming the personnel and organizational management 
system still could not provide and institutionalize a broad range of defense and military 
expertise. 
1. Weak Oversight  
Georgian legislation provides the legal framework for Parliament to exercise 
oversight of defense; however, the parliamentary oversight was commonly assessed as 
weak and less capable of holding the government and its ministers accountable.203  
The Constitution,204 the Georgian Law on Defense,205 and the Law on the Rules 
of the Procedures of Parliament of Georgia206 set the mechanisms for policy and 
budgetary oversight of defense. According to the legislation the Georgian Parliament 
defines defense state policy, approves defense laws and development concepts, discusses 
and approves defense budget, approves the strength of the armed forces, and ratifies or 
abolishes international military agreements and treaties. It also oversees implementation 
of laws in the defense field. The Parliamentary Defense and Security Committee is 
responsible for initiating and drafting the defense laws or resolutions on defense related 
regulations.  
Despite the legislative mechanisms, it is broadly noted that Parliament could not 
fully exercise legislative control and was not involved in elaborating national security 
203Christopher Berglund, “Georgia,” in The Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe, ed. S. 
Berglund and others, 3rd ed. (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013. 
204Constitution of Georgia. 
205Parliament of Georgia. “The rules of Procedure  of the Parrliement of the Georgia.” (2004). 
http://www.parliament.ge/files/819_18559_127313_reglamenti.pdf. 
206Parliament of Georgia. “Law on Defence Planning. (2006). 
https://matsne.gov.ge/index.php?option=com_ldmssearch&view=docView&id=26230&lang=en. 
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policy.207 Also defense budgeting and a majority of spending were classified, and 
therefore outside of legislative oversight to avoid disputes on military procurements.208 
Nicole Gallina gives the general assessment as following: “The period between 2003 and 
2008 was characterized by a political stalemate, with the opposition boycotting the 
Parliament, and the President having an open field to act without (even if limited) 
parliamentary control.”209 Although, it is worth noting that the Parliament “at some times 
could be very influential” and “hold the security sector on account through the Defense 
and Security and the Legal Issues Committees.”210 As evidence of this statement, 
Hiscock brings the example of when the Parliamentary Temporary Commission on 
Military Aggression and Other Acts of Russia against the Territorial Integrity of Georgia 
questioned “something unthinkable in most other post-Soviet countries.”211 
Weak legislative oversight together with the political interference discussed 
earlier hindered the building of democratic defense institutions. Less accountability to the 
Parliament as the legislative branch elected by society, nurtured the influence of 
personalities and individual perception-biased decisions. Such circumstances reduce 
democratic capacities and appear disruptive for the defense institution-building effort.  
2. Political Interference  
Defense institution-building is a highly political process as it is closely related to, 
impacts on, and is impacted by the international and domestic political developments and 
situations. Strong interactions with the political environment can have positive and 
negative effects. Effective outcome can be achieved if this closeness is used by 
207Teona Lortkipanidze, “Parliamentary Oversight on the Security Sector: Mechanisms and Practice,” 
in Democratic Control of Armed Forces of Georgia since the August War 2008, ed. Tamara Pataraia 
(Geneva: Geneva Center for Democratic Control Over the Armed Forces, 2010).43. 
208Berglund, Georgia, 27. 
209Nicole Gallina, “Puzzles in State Transformation: Armenia and Georgia,” Caucasian Review of 
International Affairs 4, no. 1 (Winter, 2010), 31. 
210Duncan Hiscock, “Impatient Reformers and Reignited Conflicts: The Case of Georgia,” in Security 
Sector Reform in Challenging Environments, eds. Hans Born and Albrecht Schnabe (Geneva: Geneva 
Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 2009), 128. 
211Ibid., 128. 
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institutions to acquire strong national and international support. On the other side, this 
closeness can create the possibility of influential impediments or political interference.212 
Political interference at the start appeared effective to defeat corruption and 
military insubordination.213 Nevertheless, the most recent years of defense institution-
building showed that the institution was ready and able to implement successful reforms 
without radical pressure. Similarly, the operational preparedness and “outstanding 
leadership of battalion commanders”214 of Georgian troops was acknowledged and 
praised by U.S. and NATO officials. The problems of defense and military institution 
building were concentrated around the strategic leadership, and the best manifestation of 
this statement was the August war and some other evidence.  
The 2008 August War demonstrated important features of defense institutional 
deficiencies, such as political interference of incompetent senior civilian leadership and 
lack of defense and military expertise. The “strategic miscalculations,” the researchers 
note, during the war were partially caused by the lack of experience and expertise of the 
senior civilian leadership (who were personally close to the President) and appeared 
directly involved in the commanding of military and humanitarian operations.215 
Nevertheless, according to the New York Times, which quotes a Department of Defense 
report, the August war showed the lack of “doctrine, institutional training and the 
experience needed to effectively command and control organizations throughout the 
chain of command.”216 
Another example of non-democratic civil-military relations and political 
interference was the process of organizing the responsive operation to the attempted 
212Hiscock, “Impatient Reformers.” 
213 De Waal, “Georgia’s Possible Future,” 6. 
 214 “Gen. Petraeus Praises Georgian Troops in Afghanistan,” Civil Georgia. 
215Geoffrey Wright, “Defense Reform and the Caucasus: Challenges of Institutional Reform during 
Unresolved Conflict,” Mediterranean Quarterly 20, no. 3 (Jul, 2009), 19–39. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org.libproxy.nps.edu/10.1215/10474552-2009-012. 
216C. J. Chivers and T. Shanker, “Georgia Lags in Its Bid to Fix Army,” New York Times, December 
17, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/18/world/europe/18georgia.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
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military mutiny at Mukhrovani Base. The analysis of contradicting versions217 of the 
mutiny’s aim is not the subject of this paper. However, the video recording spread by 
social media, which was proved to be authentic,218 shows the Minister of Internal Affairs 
(Ivane Merabishvili) directly giving illegitimate commands to the military officers, in a 
rude manner.219 
In addition, the frequent changes of political leadership in the Ministry of 
Defense, which counts eight Ministers of Defense from 2004 to 2012, had a negative 
influence on institutional developments. Very commonly, the change of minister was 
followed by “turbulent personnel changes”220 as ministers were accompanied by a 
‘trusted team’ of civil servants who, in the most cases, were “oriented to gain protection 
and patronage in exchange for subordination, obedience loyalty, and supervisor 
dependency.”221 Changes in leadership and personnel were negatively influencing the 
reform implementations, especially as it is mentioned earlier. The knowledge and skills 
related to the security field were deficient, and the loss of skills and experience was not 
easily recovered. Also, the feeling of instability and the job insecurity were affecting 
performance and initiatives. Parallel to the changes in personnel, the changes in 
leadership were followed by changes in priorities and focus of defense development. For 
example, sudden and unplanned change in the decision to increase manpower up to 
37,000 in 2009 from 28,000,222 while SDR 2007 considered moving to professional 
service of the whole armed forces and downsizing total strength from 28,666 to 
18,755.223 Again the  2012 Revised SDR document which was ready for publication 
needed to be changed according to the new minister’s (Dimitri Shashkini) “3T 
217Simons, Security Sector Reform and Georgia: The European Union’s Challenge in the Southern 
Caucasus, 272–293, 283.  
218“Vano Merabishvili: I Was Ordered To Search the Two Corpses of Russian Advisors,” Tabula, 
January 30, 2014, http://www.radiotavisupleba.ge/content/vano-merabishvili/25247738.html 
219Ibid. 
220Lortkipanidze, “After Revolution–Toward the Reform.” 
221Berglund, “Georgia,” 21‒22.  
222 Eugene Kogan, “Georgia’s Armed Forces: Army of the All or Army of the Few, The 
Hub:International Perspective.” April 5, 2013. http://www.stratfor.com/the-hub/georgias-armed-forces-
army-all-or-army-few 
223 Kezerashvili, Strategic Defense Review. 2007.  
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concept”—total training, total care, and total defense—brought to the MoD as his 
personal achievement.224 He also declared the importance of organizational and staff job 
stability225 while during the next few days approximately 20 MoD civilian employers 
were dismissed and new people from his trusted circle were appointed. It should be 
mentioned that, during these turbulent changes, NATO and partner state representatives 
were very concerned about the high turnover in staff and especially of those who had 
been trained and educated in partner state institutions. Very often the possible “pressure 
from NATO” was used to maintain the staff in the MoD.226 NATO commitments were 
also serving as the guarantor of the started reforms development. The national foreign 
policy priority—NATO integration and PARP and IPAP/ANP commitments 
implementation—were enforcing general direction and continuation of the ongoing 
reforms.  
At the same time some sources have also harshly criticized the reform progress 
and claim that Georgian officials lack ownership of the reforms, conduct them just to 
gain membership, and are focused on just façade features and not on deep changes. 
According to the critics, only small teams are in charge of these reforms, and they are not 
profound institutional processes.227 Critics also claim that the reforms are only for 
“showcasing” to “English-speaking civilian elites” or peacekeeping participation in 
Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan.228 Behind the “shows” they see the Georgian Armed 
Forces as “over-centralized, prone to impulsive decision-making, undermined by unclear 
lines of command and led by senior officials who were selected for personal relationships 
rather than professional qualifications.”229 
224 Dimitri, Shashkini “Interview with Dimistri Shashkini about the Assessment of Four Years after 
August War.” Ministry of Defence. August 6, 2012. 
http://www.mod.gov.ge/index.php?pubid=60&lang=ge. 
225 Foreign Media about New Concept of Georgia’s Defence Ministry, Georgian America, 
http://georgianamerica.com/geo/news/foreign_media_about_new_concept_of_georgias_defence_ministry_
_6316. 
226 Based on personal experience, when I was representing the HR department in meetings with 
NATO Assessment Teams.  
227 Hiscock, “Impatient Reformers,” 130, 135. 
228 Wright, “Defense Reform and the Caucasus,” 20. 
229 Chivers and T. Shanker, “Georgia Lags in Its Bid to Fix.” 
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3. Lack of Defense Expertise 
For a country with the legacy of absent defense education and defense 
institutions, the lack of defense expertise posed a special burden to progress. Moreover, 
the education from Soviet institutions was not relevant to the current security 
environment and Western defense organizations. Later, when the assistance from partner 
states became focused on the training and education, the challenge shifted to maintenance 
of this expertise. Frequent changes in leadership have caused the outflow of these skills 
and proficiencies. Thus, the limited defense educational opportunities at the national level 
still stands as a challenge to defense institution building.  
The problem of knowledge deficiency was critical at the beginning stage of 
reforms, rooted in the limited educational opportunities in the security field in post-Soviet 
educational institutions in Georgia.230 In parallel, the opportunities for Georgian officers 
to get such an education abroad were very limited. Even at the early stages, the positive 
influence of education was obvious, as Duncan Hiscock quotes an international expert on 
Georgia, “the system was not listening, but the individuals were.”231 
This problem was more or less solved by the assistance of partner states and 
NATO. Lately, Georgian civilian and military servants are offered vast opportunities for 
education and training232 in the best European and U.S. security schools, such as the U.S. 
Naval Postgraduate School, U.S. National Defense Academy, U.S. War College, NATO 
Defense College, NATO School, the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, etc. The 
NATO-Georgia Professional Development Program discussed earlier broadly assists 
Georgians to acquire critical skills for contemporary security development. The pool of 
Western-educated and trained personnel counts about 500 personnel for the U.S. 
International Military Education and Training program alone.233 At the same time, 
230 Shorena Lortkipanidze, “The Georgian Security Sector: Initiatives and Activities” in From 
Revolution to Reform: Georgia’s Struggle with Democratic Institution Building and Security Sector 
Reform, edited by Philipp H. Fluri and Eden Cole (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of 
Armed Forces (DCAF), 2005), http://www.dcaf.ch/Publications/From-Revolution-to-Reform 
231Hiscock, “Impatient Reformers,” 130. 
232Chitadze, “NATO North Atlantic Alliance.” 
233“Georgia’s Defence Transformation,” The Messenger Online, February 12, 2014, 
http://www.messenger.com.ge/issues/3051_february-12-2014/3051_mod.html. 
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national education institutions such as NDA and PDP are developing the programs 
relevant to the changing security environment and MoD requirements.  
Although the larger institutional challenge remains whether the available 
expertise is used and applied properly by Georgian entities. Despite that the professional 
development as the priority of defense reforms has been stated for a long time in the 
Minister’s Visions, Ministry of Defense and has just recently been announced as a “new 
systematic approach to the selection process for assignments on positions and foreign 
education.”234 The new initiative manifests the challenges that the defense institution has 
faced in the recent decade, such as unfair and partial selection, personal pressure, 
nepotism, and incomplete career management and professional development systems.  
Another problem contributing to the lack of expertise and challenging defense 
institution-building was the outflow of educated employees. Changes in government up 
to 2012, and the new Defense Minister, mostly meant changes in personnel. For example, 
the change of the Defense Minister in 2012 caused changes in non-political, civil service 
positions235 such as the Head of Administration and Departments of Internal Audit, 
Public Affairs, Financial Management, Defense Policy and Planning, Procurement, etc. 
New directors were personally introduced by the Minister and were appointed to the 
positions without open competition.236 
The challenges defense institutions face in their more advanced stages differed to 
its development stages. While in the early stages permanent financial underfinancing, the 
high rate of corruption, insufficiency of legal or conceptual basis, and Soviet-type 
administration were at the center of the impediments. At the second stage, challenges 
concentrated on weak parliamentary oversight, political interference, and the continued 
lack of professionalism.  
  
234Khatia Ghoghoberidze, “Assignments on Ministry of Defense Will Be Made by the Selection 
Board,” News.Ge (March 5, 2013), http://new.ge/ge/news/story/47858-tavdatsvis-saministroshi-
tanamdebobebze-danishvna-sherchevis-sabchos-mier-mokhdeba. 
235 Georgian Law on Civil Service (1997). 
236 “Ministry of Defense of Georgia Has New Personnel,” Information Portal Internet.Ge, July 9, 
2012. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
A number of external and internal factors of the international system, domestic 
politics, the legacy of the past, and the character of Georgian government have  
contributed to the uneven development of defense institution-building in Georgia. 
External factors are related to Russia, NATO integration, and partnership with NATO 
Allies, with a particular emphasis on the U.S. After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, 
Russia’s attempt to maintain its influence in the region impacted on defense institution-
building in the early stages, and also later on the August War of 2008 heavily interfered 
with the defense reforms. In parallel, Russia’s interests in the region and its support 
toward the breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia create a political 
background hindering Georgia’s integration into NATO. The positive external outcome 
of NATO’s enlargement and Georgia’s aspiration to achieve NATO integration was that 
it strongly encouraged and assisted Georgia in building its defense institutions and armed 
forces to be compatible with Western standards. Also, the U.S. foreign policy shift in 
2001, which related to the global war against terrorism, placed Georgia into a U.S. area 
of interest and caused the flow of military and financial assistance aimed at strengthening 
defense institutions and military capability development.   
Even greater is the impact of the internal political, economic, and socio-cultural 
factors on the institution building. Political factors include the political developments, 
which on their side, were heavily impacted by a Soviet legacy and unfamiliarity with 
modern, democratic statehood in the early stages. After the Rose Revolution, defense 
institution-building got special emphasis and therefore influences the content and pace of 
the state transformation. Economic underdevelopment in the first decade of Georgia’s 
post-Soviet statehood almost drove the country to failure, fed the widespread corruption, 
and disrupted the development opportunities for state institutions including defense. 
Socio-cultural features affecting the defense institution were the lack of preparedness and 
awareness of the post-Soviet society of how to contribute to state building and national 
values development.  
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Consequently, the Georgian defense institution at the stage of its creation and 
early development suffered from political turmoil, legislative insufficiency, scarceness of 
the financial resources, Soviet-type administration, and the absence of defense expertise. 
The very first challenge for the country and for the defense institution, as well, was the 
ambivalence regarding the state development either toward a Russian-influenced 
organization such as CIS or to the West. In parallel, one civil and two ethnic wars 
exacerbated the country’s political and economic situation when the defense institutions 
were being established. These wars were fought by armed groups who were united 
around t particular leaders and were not subordinate to the state. Defense institution-
building began by establishing control over the existing armed groups and transforming 
them as legitimate military forces. However, the process was severely impeded by 
permanent underfinancing and a high rate of the corruption. Soviet-type administration, 
by concentrating the decision making power in the hands of a few people, delayed if not 
disrupted cost-effective decisions and directed them to serve the personal interests of 
those influential clans. The clannish relationship rather than the level of professionalism 
and performance were needed for assignments, promotion, and rewards. As a result, the 
defense institution remained fragile and underdeveloped with little hope. 
The positive changes started when Georgia made a preference toward NATO 
partnership, invited the ISAB for advice, and when the U.S. increased financial and 
military assistance. Joining the NATO PfP and U.S. assistance programs gave 
opportunities to Georgian defense and military officers to participate in operational and 
educational training and to contribute to defense institutional developments. However, 
their knowledge was disregarded or even wasted in the fragile, mismanaged, and corrupt 
defense institutions  
The turning point became the Rose Revolution in 2003, which led the country to 
the change in regime. Declaring NATO integration as the foreign policy priority and 
establishing national security interests, the new government facilitated defense reforms. 
The Minister and Ministry of Defense became civilian to ensure civilian oversight of the 
armed forces. After 2004, by launching the SDR which introduced the framework and 
development plans of the defense institution and armed forces, comprehensive reforms 
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began. Radical measures against corruption and bribery, together with economic 
developments, and partners’ increased assistance have brought about progress in defense 
institution building. The development and introduction of resources, especially human 
resources, management policy and tools increased the level of professionalism and its fair 
application. Development of defense institution and military capability enabled Georgia 
to shift from being a failing state to becoming a successful contributor in international 
security. However, international experts and facts from 2008 August War revealed 
institutional deficiencies, which in this thesis are categorized in the three following areas: 
weak civilian oversight, political interference, and lack of professional expertise.  
Prior to NATO integration, and to some extend afterwards also, the weakness of 
civilian control and institutional-organizational challenges have been revealed among 
new NATO members as well. Obviously, a common Communist legacy affected the new 
institutions. The defense institutions in the post-Socialist states in Eastern and Central 
Europe suffered from non-democratic civilian control; and new, still fragile institutions in 
the absence of policies and with only vague roles and missions could not avoid political 
interference. Also the Socialist regime’s common legacy was the absence of the 
opportunity to get education in the defense and security fields. This logically caused the 
lack of defense expertise, which later became one of the priorities of defense reforms.  
The political realities and strong Presidential institution in Georgia constrained 
the Parliament from fully utilizing all legislative mechanisms of oversight of the defense 
institutions. State senior leadership often interfered in the defense decision making. 
Political immaturity and frequent change of civilian defense and military leadership 
caused unplanned and hectic changes in defense development directions, as well as in 
mid-level managerial and operational decisions. Improved personnel policy and 
management could not always implement the policy and overcome interference in 
particular decisions regarding promotions and assignments. Therefore, a general lack of 
professionalism was exacerbated by the mismanagement or outflow of defense expertise.  
 73 
Consequently, and optimistically, according to the Minister`s Vision237 the 
current priorities of defense institution development concentrate on enhancement of 
democratic civilian control and cooperation with the Parliament, increasing defense 
transparency, maintaining and developing skilled professionals, and implementation of 
institutional reforms.   
237Alasania, Irakli, Minister of Defense of Georgia, Minister`s Vision 2013–2014 (Tbilisi, Georgia: 
Ministry of Defense of Georgia, 2013).  
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